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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY INDEX EXCLUSION 
SCOTT HIRST* & KOBI KASTIEL** 
ABSTRACT 
Investors have long been unhappy with certain governance arrangements 
adopted by companies undertaking initial public offerings (“IPOs”), such as 
dual-class voting structures. Traditional sources of corporate governance 
rules—the Securities and Exchange Commission, state law, and exchange listing 
rules—do not constrain these arrangements. As a result, investors have turned 
to a new source of governance rules: index providers. 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of index exclusion rules and 
their likely effects on insiders’ decision-making. We show that efforts to portray 
index providers as the new sheriffs of the U.S. capital markets are overstated. 
Index providers face complex and conflicting interests, which make them 
reluctant regulators, at best. We put forward an analysis of insider incentives in 
light of index exclusions and apply it to one of the most important applications 
of index exclusion rules to date, the recent decision by index providers to exclude 
from their indexes certain companies with dual-class share structures. We 
conclude that the efficacy of index exclusions in preventing disfavored 
arrangements such as dual-class structures is likely to be limited, but not zero. 
Index exclusions are a corporate governance experiment, one that has 
important lessons. We examine these lessons, and the way forward for corporate 
governance. These lessons are all the more important because of the central 
place of index funds, and therefore index providers, in our capital markets.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 2017, Snap Inc. went public in a highly anticipated initial public 
offering (“IPO”).1 Snap’s IPO valued the company at $24 billion, making it one 
of the largest “unicorn” companies to go public.2 But to many investors, Snap’s 
IPO was controversial for another reason: Snap proposed a multi-class capital 
structure, where insiders and some pre-IPO investors had the right to vote but 
other shareholders did not.3 Shareholders buying Snap’s shares in the IPO were 
completely disenfranchised. While the number of companies going public with 
different classes of voting rights has increased in recent years, none of these 
IPOs had previously issued common stock with no voting rights at all.4 Investors 
expressed strong complaints about being forced to invest in shares without any 
voting rights.5 Snap, as some investors argue, had crossed “a line in the sand.”6 
Snap’s actions provoked the creation of a new source of governance rules. 
Investors who opposed Snap’s structure were met with indifference from Snap 
itself. None of the traditional sources of governance rules that constrain firm 
structuring decisions—the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), state 
law, or exchanges’ listing rules—were effective to prevent Snap or others like it 
from choosing extreme dual-class structures that disenfranchised shareholders. 
The rise of index investing adds another dimension to this problem. Over the 
past two decades there has been a substantial shift from active management to 
index management.7 Mutual funds are the largest investors in U.S. corporations, 
and index funds—particularly those managed by the “Big Three” investment 
managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (“SSGA”)—
are the largest mutual funds managers and are growing rapidly.8 Index investors 
 
1 Snap Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Mar. 3, 2017). 
2 Portia Crowe, Snap Is Going Public at a $24 Billion Valuation, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-ipo-price-2017-3 [https://perma. cc/A9SD 
-FZFH]. 
3 Snap Inc., supra note 1, at 4-6. 
4 Kaitlin Descovich et al., Voting Rights Gone in a Snap – Unequal Voting Rights Back in 
the Spotlight, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (Apr. 3, 2017), https://governance.weil.com/ 
whats-new/voting-rights-gone-in-a-snap-unequal-shareholder-voting-rights-back-in-the-
spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/6A3J-WAC6]. 
5 See infra Section III.A (discussing investor opposition to dual-class shares). 
6 See Hazel Bradford, Snap IPO Igniting Furor; Institutions Not Pleased, PENSIONS & 
INVS. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170320/PRINT/303209977/snap-
ipo-igniting-furor-institutions-not-pleased [https://perma.cc/UYC4-W2GQ]. 
7 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 
721 (2019). 
8 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2017, at 89, 94; Jan Fichtner, Eelke 
M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index 
Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 
298, 299 (2017). 
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make their investments according to an index: a benchmark portfolio listing 
securities and their weightings in the portfolio. Once a company with a 
disfavored governance structure is included in an index, index investors are 
essentially required to invest in the company.9 Even though many of these 
investors oppose the use of dual-class structures, they cannot avoid investing in 
companies with those structures once they are included in the index. Left without 
other means to influence Snap and future companies like it, investors advocated 
for a new source of corporate governance constraints: index composition rules.10 
At the end of July 2017, S&P Dow Jones, a prominent index provider, 
announced that the S&P Composite 1500 and its component indexes, including 
the S&P 500, would no longer add companies with multi-class structures.11 It 
adopted a strict flat exclusion, but grandfathered existing multi-class 
companies.12 Around the same time, another leading index provider, FTSE 
Russell decided to exclude companies with extremely low, or non-voting, rights 
from its indexes.13 After the adoption of the new exclusion rules, companies 
seeking inclusion in FTSE Russell’s indexes will need to have at least 5% of 
voting rights held by unaffiliated public shareholders.14 
Market participants view these new exclusion rules as an important shift in 
the governance landscape. The Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) has 
claimed that “[i]ndex providers’ action responds to a void left by years of 
inaction from stock exchanges, regulators and global regulatory coordinators.”15 
One commentator remarked that the key governance debate of the modern 
market regarding the use of dual-class shares “was fought and decided, not at 
 
9 Many “closet indexers” that follow the index closely may also feel pressure to invest in 
the company. 
10 See infra Section I.A (discussing limitations on investors’ ability to affect change). 
11 See Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces 
Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-
indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-
classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_download=true 
[https://perma.cc/T7YV-ZTD6]. Index providers differ as to whether they use the term 
“indices” (e.g., S&P Global) or “indexes” (e.g., FTSE Russell, MSCI). For consistency we 
use the term “indexes” throughout this Article. 
12 Id. 
13 See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION RESULTS – NEXT 
STEPS (July 2017), https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights 
_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN5U-3X6A]. 
14 Id. 
15 Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, CII Comment Letter to MSCI On Unequal 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission or in Congress . . . but by a couple of 
for-profit index providers.”16 
In the same vein, other market participants have focused on the growing clout 
of index providers. Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital Management 
LP, observed that “the people who create the indices are deciding which stocks 
will be invested in.”17 A memorandum issued by one of the leading Silicon 
Valley law firms anticipated that the new exclusions will likely have “a 
significant impact” on technology companies that contemplate whether to 
implement a dual-class structure in connection with their IPO.18 Similarly, 
Professor Jay Ritter, a well-known economist who has researched IPOs for 
decades anticipated that “the moves by the index firms will discourage 
companies from adopting the structure.”19 And a recent Bloomberg article, 
entitled Index Providers Rule the World—For Now, at Least, explained, “In a 
market increasingly characterized by passive investing, these players can direct 
billions of dollars of investment flows by reclassifying a single country or 
company . . . .”20 
Index exclusions are thus a new and important tool in the corporate 
governance landscape. They respond to governance arrangements that outside 
investors disfavor, but that insiders nonetheless put in place at the time of IPOs. 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of index exclusion rules and 
their likely effects on insider decision-making. We apply this analysis to 
evaluate the use of index exclusion rules with respect to dual-class structures. 
We also consider the lessons that can be drawn from this important corporate 
governance experiment. 
Our analysis first considers the political economy of index exclusions. We 
consider why disfavored arrangements are not constrained at the IPO stage, or 
by other sources of corporate governance rules, and why index providers were 
the last resort of the investors that oppose those arrangements. Whether the IPO 
process results in corporate governance arrangements that are collectively 
optimal for IPO companies is an enduring source of debate. We note that many 
 
16 Matt Levine, Index Rules and Analyst Fatigue, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-01/index-rules-and-analyst-fatigue. 
17 Tracy Alloway, Dani Burger & Rachel Evans, Index Providers Rule the World—For 
Now, at Least, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-11-27/index-providers-rule-the-world-for-now-at-least. 
18 Ran Ben-Tzur, New Index Rules Likely to Significantly Impact Tech Companies with 




19 Andrea Tan & Benjamin Robertson, Dual-Class Shares Are Coming Under Fire—
Again, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2017), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/can-
democracy-stage-a-comeback-at-stock-exchanges. 
20 Alloway, Burger & Evans, supra note 17. 
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IPOs result in companies with arrangements that outside investors broadly 
disfavor, such as dual-class share structures. These arrangements are not limited 
by traditional sources of corporate governance constraints, such as state 
corporate law, exchange listing rules, and federal securities laws. Competitive 
pressures lead these institutions to choose rules that cater to the preferences of 
corporate insiders rather than outside investors. These structural incentives are 
weakest for the SEC; however it is hamstrung by a D.C. Circuit decision that 
rejected the SEC’s prior attempt to constrain dual-class share structures.21 This 
leaves index providers as the last resort of investors. 
We next consider the position of these index providers. Index providers face 
a complex set of conflicted interests and incentives. On one hand, where 
particular arrangements are strongly disfavored by their clients, index providers 
have an incentive to respond to those preferences by adopting an exclusion rule. 
On the other hand, there are numerous factors that make index providers 
reluctant regulators, at best. First, index providers have reason to be concerned 
about federal regulation if they intervene too strongly in the corporate 
governance choices of their constituents. Second, the exclusion tool does not fit 
well with the business model of index providers and their preference not to limit 
their clients’ access to the investable universe of public companies. Third, index 
providers face a divergence in the views of their clients regarding exclusion 
rules, making them reluctant to adopt strong exclusion rules. Fourth, index 
providers also prefer to avoid sudden extreme changes in the composition of 
their indexes that would require substantial and costly portfolio rebalancing by 
their clients. Finally, index providers face some (albeit mild) competitive 
pressures that may reduce their inclination to adopt very restrictive exclusions. 
Our political economy analysis also considers the surprising opposition that 
prominent index fund managers raised against the index exclusions. BlackRock, 
for example, issued a statement publicly opposing the index exclusions.22 The 
other two largest index fund managers, Vanguard and SSGA, echoed this view.23 
Opponents to the index exclusion expressed the view that “broad market indexes 
should be as expansive and diverse as the underlying industries and economies 
 
21 Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking 
down SEC’s decision to bar self-regulatory organizations from listing dual-class stock). 
22 See Letter from Barbara Novick, Vice Chairman, BlackRock to Baer Pettit, President, 
MSCI, Inc. 1 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/ 
open-letter-treatment-of-unequal-voting-structures-msci-equity-indexes-041918.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NA39-7Q5F]. 
23 See James Rufus Koren & Paresh Dave, Index Firm Shunning Snap over Vote Rights, 
L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-snap-russell-indices-
20170727-story.html (“Portfolio managers at State Street recently wrote that excluding 
companies such as Snap ruins the whole point of indexes, which is to reflect the stock 
market. . . . Vanguard, the world’s largest provider of mutual funds, also said it was 
disappointed with the exclusion even though it favors every share having a vote.”). 
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whose performance they seek to capture.”24 This objection may be also 
motivated by the fear that the exclusions would reduce the performance of 
passive index funds compared to other active fund managers, with whom the 
passive managers compete.25 We doubt any of these reasons for passive 
managers’ opposition to the index exclusions is based on valid reasoning. This 
excessive deference of index funds to the preferences and positions of corporate 
managers is also consistent with recent work co-authored by one of us showing 
that index fund managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to the 
managers of their portfolio companies.26 The divergence among investors, 
however, is likely to decrease the tendency of index providers to use the 
exclusion tools in the future, or to tighten existing dual-class exclusions.27 
We next consider the likely effects of index exclusions on insiders’ decision-
making. Even if index providers were able to serve as investors’ new 
gatekeepers, their exclusions are unlikely to fully prevent disfavored governance 
arrangements from emerging for several reasons. First, the financial effect of 
index exclusions on the firm stock price may be more limited than initially 
assumed, and empirical evidence on the existence of such an effect is mixed. 
Second, inclusion in indexes would, in any case, happen at some point in the 
future, so the impact of index exclusions must be discounted to reflect the time 
value of money. Third, because S&P Global exercises discretion regarding 
which companies it includes in the S&P Composite Indexes, including the S&P 
500, index inclusion is not assured. Thus, the effect of the index exclusion must 
be discounted by the probability that the company would not be included in the 
index even if it were eligible. Fourth, that index inclusion is generally delayed 
for some time provides insiders with a “free option” to have their company go 
public with the disfavored arrangement and maintain it until the company would 
otherwise become eligible for index inclusion, at which point they can remove 
the arrangement. Given the limited impact of index exclusion rules, the 
likelihood that they would deter insiders from adopting certain governance 
arrangements they find valuable is also limited. This is especially the case for 
post-IPO companies because the costs of index exclusions are shared among all 
 
24 See Letter from Barbara Novick, to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 1. 
25 Traditionally, investment managers invested in the securities of particular companies 
that they thought presented good investment opportunities, referred to as “active 
management.” See Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 8, at 89-102. 
26 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 21-28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3282794. 
27 Although we use the term “dual-class,” in recent years a number of companies have 
adopted structures with more than two classes of shares. These are more accurately described 
as “multi-class” structures. However, because of the historical prevalence of two-class 
structures, the term “dual-class” is much more widely used in the literature. We therefore 
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shareholders in the company, whereas the private benefits of control from 
disfavored arrangements accrue exclusively to insiders. 
Does this mean that the index exclusions were meaningless and should be 
eliminated as some have argued? We cannot agree. At the very least, the index 
exclusions can represent a symbolic win for investors against the use of non-
voting shares. In addition, even weak index exclusions may have some effects 
on the choice of governance arrangements by IPO companies. 
We evaluate our theory of index exclusions by analyzing a case study of a 
significant use of index exclusions for policy purposes: the exclusion of dual-
class stock from the major indexes. Dual-class structures are broadly disfavored 
by outside investors.28 In particular, leading mutual funds and public pension 
funds, such as Fidelity, Vanguard, California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (“CalPERS”), and California Teachers Retirements System 
(“CalSTRS”), have committed to corporate governance guidelines that oppose 
all dual-class structures.29 In addition, those investors regularly vote against 
proposals for issuing additional classes of shares, and in favor of unification of 
multiple classes of shares into one class with equal voting rights.30 However, 
state law and listing exchanges have failed to constrain the use of dual-class 
structures, and the SEC has been hamstrung from intervening. For investors 
seeking to limit the use of dual-class structures, index providers were thus the 
last resort. 
Index providers’ reluctance to regulate is clearly reflected in the dual-class 
exclusion rules they adopted or, in the case of MSCI, failed to adopt.31 Where 
the index providers did adopt dual-class exclusion rules, those exclusions 
contained important loopholes and limitations. The S&P dual-class exclusion 
 
28 For example, in summer 2016, a group of leaders of asset managers as well as operating 
companies issued a set of consensus governance principles including a statement that “dual-
class voting is not a best practice.” See Margaret Popper, Sard Verbinnen & Co., 
Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (July 22, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/22/commonsense-princi 
ples-of-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/US7E-AFZD]. Additionally, the CII, an 
organization of more than 140 public, union, and corporate pension funds, has declared the 
structure to be “fundamentally flawed as a long-term capital model.” See Dual-Class Stock: 
Governance at the Edge,  DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Third Quarter 2012, AT 37, 38, 
http://sites.udel.edu/wccg/files/2012/10/Dual-Shares-Q3-20121.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BL9-
WR9Q] (quoting Ann Yerger, then Executive Director of the CII). 
29 For statements reflecting the opposition of major institutional investors to dual-class 
structures, see CALPERS, GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES 12 (2018), https://ww 
w.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainability-principles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3GFN-428X]; Proxy Voting, FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, https://www.fidelity.c 
om/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/fmr/proxy-guidelines [perma.cc/NUV3-7C2U] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2019); Policies and Guidelines, VANGUARD (2016), [https://perma.cc/W7PA-
LTRP].  
30 See infra Section III.A. 
31 See infra Section III.C.3. 
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applies only to new IPO companies, and may not be relevant to many dual-class 
companies for years following an IPO.32 The Russell exclusion can be 
circumvented by ensuring that public investors hold slightly more than five 
percent of voting rights and thus still enables the inclusion of companies with 
extreme separation between controllers’ equity and voting rights.33  
Data that we collected on the incidence of dual-class IPOs before and after 
the adoption of the dual-class exclusions confirms our theory that index 
exclusions are likely to have limited but non-zero effects. Index exclusions were 
not effective enough to substantially eliminate the use of dual-class shares. Lyft, 
Inc.’s recent and high-profile decision to go public with a dual-class structure 
illustrates this desire to maintain company control, notwithstanding the potential 
adverse consequence of being excluded from certain indexes.34 However, on the 
margin, insiders seem to have reduced their use of dual-class structures at the 
IPO stage.35   
In addition, the details of the dual-class arrangements that have been adopted 
since the Snap IPO suggest other patterns. A limited but increasing proportion 
of dual-class companies are choosing to go public with time-based sunset 
provisions incorporated into their charters, which automatically unify the share 
structure after a number of years.36 Further, since the Snap IPO, no companies 
have issued non-voting shares in their IPOs.37 While it may be too early to draw 
definite conclusions, this initial data seems to suggest some effects on IPO 
arrangements since the dual-class exclusion rules came into effect. 
The dual-class exclusions also represent an important symbolic victory for 
certain investors. The Snap IPO represented the high-water mark in a long trend 
towards more frequent and more unequal dual-class structures. Investors were 
concerned that if the Snap IPO went unchallenged, it would set a new and 
dangerous precedent for future companies going public.38 The ability of these 
investors to influence index providers to exclude dual-class companies, even in 
a limited fashion, reaffirms the power of those investors. 
A number of important lessons can be drawn from our analysis. Chief among 
them is that the effort to portray index providers as the new sheriffs of the U.S. 
capital markets is likely to be an overstatement. The nature of the index provider 
business is to mimic existing broad markets. This limits the extent to which 
 
32 See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra Section III.C.2. 
34 Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 13 (Mar. 18, 2019). 
35 See infra Section III.E.1 (graphing dual-class share IPOs). 
36 See Letter from Council of Institutional Inv’rs to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory 
Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc. 2-5 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues 
_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/20181024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multicla
ss%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH5U-9ZGP]. 
37 Four multi-class companies have gone public with non-voting shares authorized in their 
charter. However, all four have left those shares “on the shelf,” rather than issuing them in 
their IPO. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. 
  
1238 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1229 
 
index providers can implement index exclusions. Were index providers to 
implement profligate exclusion rules, their indexes would no longer reflect the 
investable marketplace. Other concerns relate to index providers’ role as 
reluctant regulators, to the delayed impact of the index exclusion rules, and to 
the disagreement among investors regarding whether index exclusions should 
be used to achieve their common goals. At any rate, we believe that the recent 
calls to eliminate index exclusions are premature, and investors, index providers, 
and policy-makers would be better served by pausing to observe the impact of 
the index exclusions. 
In the meantime, outside investors should consider whether there are 
alternative, viable, and effective mechanisms to discourage insiders from 
adopting disfavored arrangements at the IPO stage. To that end, we consider the 
effectiveness of three alternative approaches: coordinated cooperative action of 
exchanges, providing index investors with a menu of investment index options 
with indexes that include and exclude the disfavored arrangement, and collective 
action by investors themselves.  
Before proceeding we wish to identify and address an important assumption 
on which this Article is based. This Article focuses on companies that have 
governance arrangements in place, such as dual-class structures, that their 
investors, taken as a whole, would prefer that they not have. At face value this 
assumption would seem to be justified; in Section III.A we describe how a broad 
group of investors have expressed their opposition to dual-class structures, 
through their statements, policies, and voting behavior.  
An argument that has often been advanced in corporate governance holds 
that there are no disfavored governance arrangements, as long as these terms are 
accurately priced. That is, if insiders put in place governance arrangements that 
are unfavorable to outside investors, then those investors will reduce the price 
they are willing to pay for the shares accordingly. Insiders will receive a lesser 
amount in the IPO and consequently will have reduced incentives to go public 
with governance terms that outside investors disfavor.39 By this argument, if a 
company has a disfavored governance arrangement, outside investors (or their 
predecessors) have received a discount when they invested in the company at 
the IPO, and any readjustment of those arrangements after the fact entails a 
wealth transfer between the insiders and outsiders.  
This argument, however, is predicated on the efficiency of the IPO pricing 
mechanism, a matter which has been subject to vigorous debate.40 In this Article 
 
39 For a general formulation of the argument that IPO pricing reflects the quality of offered 
governance, see Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class 
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 123-25 (1987); Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2366-68 (1998). 
40 For studies contesting the efficiency of the IPO pricing mechanism, see, for example, 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 
726-28 (2003); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83-86 (2001). For a well-known 
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we do not attempt to solve this long-standing debate, though we do wish to note 
three points that we believe leave room for the existence of disfavored 
governance arrangements. 
First, for the IPO pricing mechanism to result in optimal corporate 
governance arrangements requires a very high degree of market efficiency. This 
is because the pricing of the future potential decrease in firm value due to the 
use of unfavorable governance terms depends on numerous factors and 
contingencies, some of which will come into effect only many years after the 
IPO. 
Second, the pricing argument is not just an objection to the theory of index 
exclusions, but also to any (unpriced) restriction on the terms that insiders may 
choose to offer when going public. Those who fully believe in the efficiency of 
the IPO pricing mechanism should not only reject the need for index exclusions, 
but should also regard most of the restrictions on corporate governance 
arrangements that have been implemented through regulation, legislation, or 
judicial action as unnecessary, since the IPO market should result in optimal 
governance terms without any need for adjustment by outside rule-makers. We 
take as given that the majority of our readers accept that investors should be able 
to limit certain arrangements that they disfavor at the IPO stage, or to adjust post 
IPO, and are interested in the most efficient way of doing so. 
Finally, regardless of one’s view on the efficiency of the pricing mechanism 
at the IPO stage, it is important to emphasize that investors do manifest a strong 
preference against the use of certain governance terms, such as dual-class 
structures, and this preference is not contingent on the pricing of those 
arrangements. If investors’ major concern was that these arrangements were 
inappropriately priced, then those investors could refine their guidelines or 
voting decisions accordingly and would support dual-class shares if they 
believed that their cost to the company had been properly incorporated into the 
price of the company’s shares. However, this is not observed in investor 
opposition to dual-class structures. Instead, investors express strong opposition 
to dual-class structures, and do so consistently across different companies, 
regardless of how the shares of those companies are priced.  
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the political economy of 
index exclusions. Part II puts forward a theory of the effects of index exclusions 
and why their effects are likely to be limited but non-zero. Part III applies our 
analytical framework to the most important case of index exclusions: the dual-
class exclusion rules. Part IV considers the lessons from our analysis and a 
number of ways forward. 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDEX EXCLUSIONS 
In this Part we examine the forces and incentives shaping the index exclusions 
and the responses to them. Section I.A explains why investor preferences 
 
collection of articles expressing different views on the subject, see Symposium, The Debate 
on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). 
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regarding corporate governance constraints are often not satisfied by traditional 
sources of governance rules, leaving index providers as a last resort. Section I.B 
describes the forces acting on index providers themselves, which make them 
reluctant regulators. Section I.C explains the divergence in views among index 
investors regarding index exclusions and why index fund managers may oppose 
index exclusions. 
A. The Demand for Index Exclusions: Index Providers as a Last Resort 
The story of the Snap IPO raises an important question: if certain 
arrangements are disfavored by investors, why are they not constrained by 
corporate governance rules? Corporate governance arrangements are subject to 
constraints from several sources. While the shareholders of a potential IPO 
company are generally free to determine the voting arrangements and other 
important rules that apply to corporations, certain mandatory requirements of 
state law constrain the scope of these arrangements.41 Once the company goes 
public, the mandatory provisions of exchange listing requirements42 and 
securities laws43 constrain the company’s arrangements. As this Part explains, 
state law and exchanges have structural incentives to favor insiders over outside 
investors and therefore to not constrain arrangements favored by insiders but not 
outsiders. The SEC has a mix of historical and incentive problems that limits its 
ability to intervene in order to protect outside investors from disfavored 
arrangements. Structural incentives also explain why index providers have been 
more willing to intervene to constrain disfavored arrangements: they have 
structural incentives to favor investors over insiders. 
State law and exchange listing rules have not constrained the use of 
arrangements favorable to inside shareholders and unfavorable to outside 
investors. That is because the interests of state legislatures and exchanges are 
more closely aligned with the interests of insiders than those of outside investors. 
 
41 See Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 289 (2018). 
For example, Delaware corporations are required to hold shareholder meetings each year, 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2019), and may not opt-out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
that is incumbent on directors. Id. § 102(b)(7). For a longer list of mandatory provisions in 
Delaware corporate law, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1553-54 (1989). 
42 For instance, the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq listing rules require their listed 
companies to have a majority of independent directors, NYSE Listing Rule 303A.01; Nasdaq 
Listing Rule 5605(b)(1), and to have audit and compensation committees with only 
independent directors, NYSE Listing Rule 303A.06; Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(c)(2). 
43 Most obviously, these constraints include the comprehensive disclosure requirements 
applicable to public companies. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012) (periodic and other 
disclosure); id. § 78n(c) (disclosure relating to proxy solicitations). Additional constraints are 
imposed through the SEC’s oversight of the exchanges, whereby the SEC is required to 
approve changes in exchange listing rules, and can require exchanges to take certain actions. 
See id. § 78s(b)(1) (regulating self-regulatory organizations). 
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States and exchanges compete with other states and exchanges for 
incorporations and listings. The insiders of the corporation prior to the IPO 
decide where corporations incorporate and list. Were a state or exchange to limit 
the ability of corporations to adopt terms favorable to insiders, they could choose 
to incorporate in another state or to list on another exchange. As a result, states 
and exchanges prefer not to constrain arrangements that insiders favor because 
permitting more discretion attracts companies to incorporate or list in higher 
numbers. A long debate regarding state competition for incorporations has 
shown that competition for incorporations and listings will lead states and 
exchanges to follow the preferences of those that make incorporation and listing 
decisions—in this case corporate insiders.44 Because those insiders prefer the 
freedom to use arrangements that outsiders may nonetheless disfavor, states and 
exchanges will refrain from limiting those choices. 
Because of the political nature of the SEC, it is also subject to competing 
influence from outside investors, which counterbalance the influence of 
insiders.45 One of the SEC’s primary responsibilities is to protect investors, 
which may lead it to constrain arrangements that unduly favor insiders at the 
expense of outside investors. However, in some cases, such as that of dual-class 
shares, the SEC is constrained from acting for constitutional or institutional 
reasons. After the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) relaxed its rules to 
permit dual-class shares in 1986, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4, which had the 
effect of requiring exchange listing rules to prohibit dual-class shares.46 In 
Business Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Commission,47 the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s rule, on the grounds that the 
rule exceeded the SEC’s authority under section 19 of the Securities Exchange 
Act, which did not extend to SEC regulation of corporate governance matters.48 
Although the SEC persuaded the main stock exchanges to prohibit dual-class 
recapitalizations under their listing standards, the practical effect of the Business 
Roundtable decision has been to tie the SEC’s hands and prevent it from direct 
involvement in constraining many corporate governance arrangements. 
 
44 For a discussion of state law competition, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444-46 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 685-86 (1974). For a discussion of 
competition for listings, and among securities laws, see Romano, supra note 39, at 2365-72; 
Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer 
Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 530-31 (2005). 
45 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2509-10 (2005) 
(describing possibility of federal response if Delaware policy became excessively pro-
manager). 
46 Governing Certain Listing or Authorization Determinations by National Securities 
Exchanges and Associations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2018). 
47 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
48 Id. at 408. 
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Even in cases where the SEC is not limited by constitutional factors, it also 
faces two competing pressures. As with state corporate law and listing rules, the 
SEC faces some competitive pressure from other jurisdictions. Just as insiders 
can choose which corporate laws apply to them by their decision where to 
incorporate, so too can they choose which securities laws apply to them by 
deciding where they incorporate and list. Corporations headquartered in the 
United States can choose to incorporate and list abroad and not in the United 
States (for instance in Frankfurt, Hong Kong, or London), so that they would be 
subject to another country’s securities laws.49 Corporations incorporated abroad 
can choose to list on U.S. exchanges, making them subject to U.S. securities 
laws. This competitive pressure may also limit the willingness of the SEC to 
constrain arrangements that insiders favor, such as unequal voting structures. 
The competitive value for the U.S. capital markets of allowing unequal shares 
has been raised as an argument against limiting those rules. In 2014, Chinese-
headquartered Ali Baba chose to list on the NYSE rather than the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, in large part because Hong Kong securities laws would have 
prevented it from using the unequal voting structure its insiders preferred. As 
with states and exchanges, this makes the SEC more susceptible to follow the 
preferences of insiders and not constrain arrangements even though they may be 
disfavored by outside investors. Since 1996, the SEC has been required to 
consider the effects of its rules on “efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”50 In addition to considering the threat of losing listings to foreign 
capital markets, this may require the SEC to consider whether its rules might 
lead insiders not to go public at all. If the SEC were to unduly constrain the 
ability of insiders to put in place governance arrangements they favor at the IPO 
stage, then the argument goes, those insiders might choose to have the company 
remain private rather than going public.51 
Index providers are driven by a different set of incentives. They have been 
willing to intervene in constraining terms that outside investors disfavor where 
other corporate governance rule makers were not because their structure 
incentivized them to follow the interests of outside investors over insiders. Index 
providers generate income from index fund managers and other investors that 
license their indexes. Index providers compete to attract assets from those 
investors. As a result, they have a structural incentive to follow the preferences 
of investors. In this sense they are unique among potential sources of corporate 
governance constraints, the others of which have incentives to follow the 
preferences of insiders. For instance, with respect to the dual-class exclusion, 
 
49 Tung, supra note 44, 561-78 
50 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2012); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78a-qq. 
51 For a discussion of this argument and its limitations, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi 
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the CII has stated that “[i]ndex providers’ action responds to a void left by years 
of inaction from stock exchanges, regulators and global regulatory 
coordinators.”52 
B. Index Providers as Reluctant Regulators 
The rise of index exclusions as a new source of corporate governance rules 
has created a new promise among investors in favor of more robust constraints 
on disfavored governance arrangements. At the same time, it has also generated 
considerable opposition among insiders, and—as discussed in Section I.C—
among index fund managers. Both camps view the rise of index providers as 
regulators as an important shift in the corporate governance landscape. 
Discussing dual-class arrangements, one commentator stated that the key 
governance debate of the modern market regarding the use of dual-class shares 
“was fought and decided, not at the Securities and Exchange Commission or in 
Congress . . . but by a couple of for-profit index providers.”53 
However, as we will discuss in this Section, index providers are far from 
ruling the world, or even from being a primary source of corporate governance 
regulation. They are motivated by a complex set of conflicted interests and 
incentives and are subject to several significant constraints, which makes them 
reluctant regulators at best. What constrains index providers? 
To begin, index providers are not ordinary regulators. They face an important 
structural limitation by the very nature of their business: broad market indexes 
have to be as expansive and diverse as the underlying industries and economies 
whose performance they seek to capture. Therefore, in constructing indexes, 
index providers are limited in their ability to regulate governance terms of public 
companies by using the exclusion tool too often. Were they to do so, the indexes 
they produce would no longer reflect the investable marketplace. For instance, 
imagine that socially conscious investors pushed index providers to exclude 
from the index gun manufacturers; tobacco companies; companies that 
inadequately disclose their carbon emissions; companies without women 
directors; and companies that adopt other governance terms that investors 
generally disfavor, such as classified boards, dual-class shares, and plurality 
voting. If that were the case, the list of excluded companies would be so large 
that indexes would no longer serve their business purpose of reflecting the 
performance of the industries and economies whose performance they seek to 
capture. 
This imposes a natural limit on the extent to which index providers can 
exclude companies from their indexes. It explains why index providers intervene 
only as a matter of last resort, when other sources of governance regulation have 
not. A preference for broad coverage makes index exclusions a nuclear option, 
to be reserved for extreme situations. The effort to portray index providers as the 
new sheriffs of the U.S. capital markets is therefore an overstatement. At most, 
 
52 Bertsch, supra note 15. 
53 Levine, supra note 16. 
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they may intervene in one or two governance arrangements, most likely those 
that investors are unable to amend midstream through private ordering. 
Even taking this natural limitation into account, there remains an open 
question whether index providers could act as determined and effective 
regulators on the few matters in which they would be willing to intervene. As 
we will show in the remainder of this Part, index providers face a complex set 
of conflicted interests and incentives, which limit their willingness to constrain 
corporate governance arrangements, and make them, at best, reluctant 
regulators.  
The role of index providers as reluctant regulators has a number of 
explanations. First, index providers are likely to be concerned about the threat 
of federal intervention in their operations, which would make them subject to 
more stringent regulations.54 Once index providers start acting as regulators by 
making specific governance characteristics part of the criteria for inclusion, they 
subject themselves to a greater risk of being regulated in the same way as stock 
exchanges or credit rating providers, including S&P Global’s own credit ratings 
department. As profit maximizing businesses, index providers are likely to be 
rather averse to being regulated and the additional costs and constraints that it 
would impose. They can therefore be expected to demonstrate self-restraint in 
their actions and to prefer weaker or less effective exclusion rules. 
These concerns regarding federal intervention are not unfounded. Following 
the adoption of the index exclusions, leading market participants began to 
question the ability of index providers to act as regulators. SEC Chairman Jay 
Clayton explained that he did not think indexes should choose which stocks to 
include based on voting power, stating, “Governance by indexation doesn’t sit 
really well with me.”55 SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson Jr. stated that 
“excluding all dual-class firms from our major market indices is a blunt tool. 
And it’s one I’m deeply worried about.”56 Consistent with these views, 
BlackRock expressed its opinion that “policymakers, not index providers, 
should set corporate governance standards.”57 
At the same time, a number of commentators have questioned whether index 
providers are well suited to determine which companies should be included in 
 
54 For similar arguments made regarding likely concern on the part of index funds 
regarding greater regulation, see Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 26 (manuscript at 61). 
55 Andrea Vittorio, FTSE Russell to Revisit Voting Power One Year After Snap IPO, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.bna.com/ftse-russell-revisit-n57982089820/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y25Y-WEEF] (quoting Chairman Jay Clayton). 
56 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at Berkeley Law: 
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-
royalty#_ftn29 [https://perma.cc/JQ48-KC4L]. 
57 See Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 1. 
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the index.58 Others criticize the lack of transparency in index providers’ 
processes. Some have argued that “very little is known about [index providers’] 
internal workings.”59 Commissioner Jackson and Professor Steven Davidoff 
Solomon claim that index providers “face little regulatory scrutiny and can face 
significant conflicts of interest, which have the potential to harm American 
investors.”60 They argue that “we need a national conversation about how to 
ensure that they operate with integrity, transparency and accountability.”61 This 
lack of regulation over index providers “has become increasingly salient as 
index providers make decisions that affect the governance of companies seeking 
to be listed on major exchanges.”62 Continued questioning of the legitimacy of 
index providers as the creators of governance rules is likely to heighten the threat 
of regulatory oversight of index providers. 
These concerns regarding a regulatory backlash could have a chilling effect 
on index providers, both ex ante and ex post. Ex ante, these concerns could cause 
index providers to adopt relatively “weak” exclusions to decrease the likelihood 
of a regulatory response. Ex post, the calls for regulatory intervention could 
decrease the likelihood that index providers will strengthen the weak index 
exclusions they adopted, or could even lead index providers to further weaken—
or eliminate—those exclusions. 
Index providers’ concerns regarding regulation are likely to have influenced 
them to reduce the salience of their power. Index providers have repeatedly 
emphasized the fact that they are for-profit organizations, not regulators. For 
example, in a panel discussion addressing the role of index providers, David 
Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at S&P Dow Jones Indices, 
“suggested that the decision on whether dual-class structures should be banned 
or limited should be a decision taken by legislatures, regulators, and stock 
 
58 See, e.g., Matt Levine, Stocks Are Forever, and Your Future Grandchild Knows It, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-19/sec-s-
commissioner-sparks-debate-on-dual-class-stocks (“An index provider, whose job is mostly 
to make lists of what stocks there are, is not necessarily well suited to deciding what stocks 
there should be.”); Ann Lipton, Index as Cartel, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Aug. 12, 2017), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/08/index-as-cartel.html [https://perma. 
cc/F42T-6YQ7] (“[I]ndex investors aren’t supposed to be actively picking stock 
characteristics . . . .”). 
59 Anita Anand & Adriana Robertson, Stock Market Indices: Inside the Black Box, CLS 
BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 21, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/03/21/the-lack-of-
transparency-in-stock-market-indices [https://perma.cc/PAX2-V7BN]. 
60 Robert J. Jackson Jr. & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What’s Really in Your Index Fund?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2019, at A23. 
61 Id. 
62 See supra note 59. Professors Anand and Robertson also query: “Given the extent to 
which the market relies on the information that indices provide, should they be subject to 
some form of regulatory oversight, including disclosure requirements? These are pressing 
questions that merit urgent answers.” Anand & Robertson, supra note 59. 
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exchanges, not index providers.”63 Mark Makepeace, head of FTSE Russell, 
emphasized the passive role of index providers, stating that “[w]e’re not 
activists. . . . [O]ur role is to build consensus amongst that investor community 
as to what that minimum standard should be.”64 Similarly, MSCI Chairman and 
CEO Henry Fernandez stated, “We’re not looking to play this role.”65 
There is also evidence that the index exclusions were “imposed” on index 
providers by some of their clients, and that the exclusion tool does not fit well 
with index providers’ preference not to limit their clients’ access to the 
investable universe of public companies. FTSE Russell, for example, 
emphasized the fact that its index exclusion decision came after considerable 
consultation with their investors and was aimed to build a consensus among 
those investors.66 MSCI’s Chairman and CEO said to investors, “[Y]ou push it 
to us.”67 Given these circumstances, it is likely that index providers’ preference 
would be to appease those investors that oppose the use of dual-class shares, but 
to do so without making groundbreaking changes. 
Further support for the view that index exclusions do not fit the business 
model and ideology of index providers comes from an S&P policy change in 
2014, which cuts in the opposite direction from the index exclusions. At that 
time, S&P permitted Google Inc. to include both its Class A and Class C shares 
in the S&P 500 index.68 S&P representatives explained that this change was due 
to the trend—especially among tech companies—of offering multiple share 
classes.69 Were S&P to ignore the trend, it would have difficulty “properly 
representing major market segments while providing sufficient liquidity to 
accommodate trading and necessary index adjustments.”70 Building on that 
exception, S&P later included in their index two classes of shares of other large 
dual-class companies such as Comcast Corporation, Fox Corporation, and News 
 
63 EUROPEAN CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., HARV. L. SCH., GLOBAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COLLOQUIUM REPORT 5 (June 2018), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/event 
s/_4th_annual_global_corporate_governance_colloquium_small.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP6Y 
-DESG]. 
64 Matt Levine, Index Providers Can Make or Break Passive Investors, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
28, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-28/index-providers-can-
make-or-break-passive-investors. 
65 Vittorio, supra note 55 (referring to comments by MSCI Chairman and CEO Henry 
Fernandez at CII conference in March 2018). 
66 See FTSE RUSSELL, supra note 13, at 4-6. 
67 Vittorio, supra note 55. 
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Corporation.71 This policy change received significantly less attention than the 
recent index exclusions, but reveals index providers’ true preference to mimic 
the market as much as possible. The index exclusions tended against this natural 
inclination. 
Third, as we describe in Section I.C below, investors have mixed views 
regarding the use of index exclusions. While some investors, such as CalSTRS 
and the CII strongly supported the index exclusions,72 index fund managers such 
as BlackRock and Vanguard opposed them.73 Those investment managers 
claimed that if index funds were required to exclude certain public companies 
from their indexes then the index funds would become much less representative 
of the investment universe the index funds are trying to represent, thereby 
reducing their value to investors in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds 
(“ETFs”).74 This divergence of opinions among the clients of index providers 
caused the index providers to navigate carefully. On the one hand, index 
providers had to implement some exclusion principles to mollify the investors 
that opposed the use of dual-class shares and insisted on a response to the Snap 
IPO. On the other hand, index providers had to restrain their actions to avoid 
antagonizing those clients that opposed “governance by indexation.” Index 
providers are thus caught between their fear of doing too much and their fear of 
doing too little. 
Fourth, index providers are also likely to prefer gradual changes in the 
composition of their broad market indexes, rather than sudden and significant 
changes. Extreme changes in indexes’ composition could require index investors 
to make very large volumes of trades to adjust to the new index composition or 
weightings.75 Making more gradual changes would also allow index providers 
to observe market reactions to their index exclusions before strengthening those 
exclusions. This concern about sudden significant changes could also explain 
why index providers would have an incentive to exempt from their exclusion 
rules those companies that are already included in the index; or at the very least, 
to allow a “grandfathering” period during which constituent companies could 
change their capital structure to avoid being excluded. 
 
71 Joseph Ciolli, S&P 500 to Add Second Class of Shares for Fox, Comcast, News, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-
10/s-p-500-to-add-second-class-of-shares-for-fox-comcast-news. 
72 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
73 See Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 4; infra notes 81-82 and 
accompanying text. 
74 See Koren & Dave, supra note 23. 
75 See Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 1; see also Barbara 
Novick, BlackRock, Inc., Open Letter Regarding Consultation on the Treatment of Unequal 
Voting Structures in the MSCI Equity Indexes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
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Finally, the index investing market has become more competitive in recent 
years. Increasing competitive pressures could cause leading index providers to 
adopt more relaxed exclusions, so as to avoid losing clients to their 
competitors.76 We believe this argument to be the least persuasive of the 
explanations for index provider reluctance. As we will show in Section III.B.2, 
there is some “stickiness” in the initial selection of an index by an index fund, 
and there are likely to be significant hurdles and costs associated with an index 
fund switching indexes. These include the need to change the index fund’s 
constitutive documents, the loss of network effects, and the risk associated with 
investing in an index with less brand recognition. These reasons are likely to 
limit the willingness of index funds to change indexes, and therefore limit the 
forces of competition on index provider choices. However, collectively, the 
different factors that we have identified give index providers incentives to be 
reluctant regulators, at best. 
C. Index Fund Opposition to Index Exclusions 
In this Section we examine a revealing phenomenon: prominent index fund 
managers clearly disfavor certain governance arrangements such as dual-class 
exclusions, however they publicly oppose index exclusions aimed at curbing 
those arrangements.77 This Section considers the reasons for index fund 
managers to oppose index exclusions and evaluates the validity of those reasons. 
1. Competition for Assets 
Some scholars have argued that competition for assets among investment 
managers influences the behavior of investment managers. Professors Jill Fisch, 
Assaf Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, for example, argue that index 
fund managers compete for funds “not only with each other but also with active 
funds.”78  
Investment managers are paid a fixed percentage of their assets under 
management. They therefore have incentives to increase their assets under 
 
76 Andrew Winden & Andrew Baker, Dual-Class Index Exclusion 49 (July 24, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201578. 
77 See Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 1 (“[W]e believe 
policymakers, not index providers, should set corporate governance standards.”); see also 
Koren & Dave, supra note 23 (citing Vanguard and SSGA opposition). 
78 Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Passive Investors 11 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 414, 2018).  Consistent with this 
argument, BlackRock’s statement indicates that the exclusion rules “could limit our index-
based clients’ access to the investable universe of public companies and deprive them of 
opportunities for returns.” BLACKROCK, A POTENTIAL SOLUTION FOR VOTING RIGHTS AND 
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management as much as possible by attracting additional assets from investors.79 
The factors that drive investor assets to different funds have been the subject of 
much debate. The generally accepted view is that investors make decisions on 
which investment managers to invest with based on the past performance of 
those investment managers.80 If this is the case, then index funds may have 
opposed index exclusions because they feared that the exclusions would reduce 
the performance of index funds compared to other fund managers, and would 
therefore reduce the assets under management—and the revenues—of index 
funds. 
Concern that excluding companies with certain arrangements would reduce 
index fund performance will only be relevant if (1) companies with those 
arrangements are likely to significantly outperform other companies and (2) the 
proportion of the companies that outperform (net of those that underperform) 
are a substantial proportion of the index. The average company in the S&P 500 
represents 0.2% of the index. If such a company outperforms other companies 
in the index by 5% in a year, having included that company would only increase 
the aggregate performance of the index by 0.01%, which would be unlikely to 
affect investor judgments. For larger indexes, such as the Russell 1000 or 2000, 
the effect would be only 0.005% or 0.0025%. Of course, if excluded companies 
underperform other companies, then the index will perform better than it would 
have with the excluded companies. However, if index fund managers are risk 
averse, they may prefer to give up the possibility of outperforming their peers in 
exchange for not bearing the risk of underperformance. 
Competition with other index funds cannot explain the opposition of index 
fund managers to index exclusions. If an index excludes a set of companies with 
disfavored arrangements that nonetheless perform better, on average, than other 
companies in the index, the index will perform worse than it would have had 
those companies been included. However, the effect will be the same for all 
index funds benchmarked to that index. That is, BlackRock’s S&P 500 fund will 
underperform exactly as much as Vanguard’s S&P 500 fund, so BlackRock will 
not be concerned about losing investments to Vanguard. Might BlackRock be 
concerned about investors switching to an index fund that has not excluded 
companies with disfavored arrangements to the same extent? All of the “Big 
Three” index fund managers offer index funds that are linked to the indexes of 
each of the three index providers. As a result, it is unlikely that BlackRock would 
lose investors that preferred a Russell index to an S&P index. Instead such 
investors are equally or more likely to switch from BlackRock’s S&P index fund 
to BlackRock’s Russell index fund. 
 
79 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 8, at 90. 
80 See, e.g., Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 
1589, 1590 (1998) (“Mutual fund consumers chase returns, flocking to funds with the highest 
recent returns, though failing to flee from poor performers.”). 
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A more plausible explanation for index fund opposition to index exclusions 
is a concern that, were companies with disfavored arrangements to substantially 
outperform other companies, index funds would underperform actively managed 
funds, and lose assets to them. However, concern about the underperformance 
of index funds will be lessened based on two factors. First, managers of index 
funds also manage actively managed funds. For instance, BlackRock also 
manages many actively managed funds.81 As a result, any assets lost because of 
the underperformance of index funds that exclude companies with disfavored 
arrangements would be offset by funds gained by its outperforming actively 
managed funds.  
Second, many actively managed funds are, in fact, “closet indexers”—their 
investment patterns overlap substantially with the indexes against which they 
benchmark their performance.82 That is, a significant proportion of those 
actively managed follows the composition of the indexes to which they 
benchmark. This suggests that if companies with disfavored arrangements were 
to be excluded from important indexes, then many actively managed funds 
would also drop those companies from their indexes. Actively managed funds 
that did so would not outperform index funds, and would not threaten to take 
assets under management from index funds. 
2. Ideological Preference to Cover the Market 
The second stated reason for BlackRock’s opposition to the index fund 
exclusion was their view that “broad market indexes should be as expansive and 
diverse as the underlying industries and economies whose performance they 
seek to capture.”83 
This claim rings slightly hollow, for three reasons. First, the moderate 
exclusionary rules of the three indexes would only exclude some dual-class 
shares, retaining access to those sectors of the economy. Second, the S&P 
Composite indexes do not reflect the investable universe by including all eligible 
companies in all industries.84 Instead, a committee selects a set of companies 
that they believe will reflect the returns of major industries. If the index selection 
committee chooses poorly there may already be some parts of the investable 
universe that are not covered by the S&P Composite index. Following the index 
exclusions, the selection committee could adjust the index to ensure that all 
 
81 See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Feb. 28, 2019) (breaking 
out assets under management by active and passive products). 
82 For empirical evidence on the prevalance of closet indexers, see generally K.J. Martijn 
Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that Predicts, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009). 
83 Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 22, at 1. 
84 See, e.g., S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P U.S. INDICES METHODOLOGY 9-12 (Jan. 2019). 
For recent work discussing the discretionary nature of index funds, see generally Adriana 
Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, YALE J. 
ON REG. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244991. 
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industries are adequately covered. Third, at least one part of the economy has 
already been excluded from major indexes. Since 2006 the SEC has required 
investment funds that own shares of business development companies 
(“BDCs”)—publicly traded investment companies that invest in small- and 
medium-sized companies—to disclose the fees and expenses of the BDCs.85 In 
2014, following pressure from index funds, FTSE Russell and S&P Global 
excluded BDCs from their indexes.86  
Additionally, the three major indexes—FTSE Russell, MSCI, and S&P—also 
adopted eligibility criteria stipulating that companies must have a U.S. domicile 
in order to be included in the index.87 Therefore, e-commerce giant Alibaba and 
many other foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges are excluded from major 
indexes.88 Additional ineligible organizational structures include publicly traded 
limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and master limited 
partnerships.89 There have been no public statements from index fund managers 
opposing those exclusions, even though they reduced the expansiveness and 
diversity in which index fund investors invest.90 
3. Incentives to Be Deferential to Portfolio Company Managers 
A third reason why index fund managers may oppose index exclusions relates 
to their incentives to be excessively deferential to the managers and insiders of 
their portfolio companies. One of us—with other co-authors—has examined the 
 
85 Fund of Fund Investments, Investment Company Act Release No. 33-8713, 71 Fed. Reg. 
36,639, 36,640-45 (June 27, 2006) (amending Form N-1A to require disclosure of “Acquired 
Fund Fees and Expenses” in certain circumstances). 
86 See, e.g., DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 84, at 6 (listing BDCs as an organizational 
structure that is ineligible for index inclusion) EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND, A CLOSER LOOK: 
IMPACT OF THE SEC’S AFFE RULE ON BDCS, https://www.publiclytradedprivateequity.com 
/portalresource/WhatIsTheAFFERule.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9KZ-NDAG] (last visited Apr. 
13, 2019). 
87 S&P DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 84, at 5 (stating that “[o]nly common stocks of 
U.S. companies are eligible”). 
88 Dennis Hudachek, Alibaba IPO’s Huge ETF Conundrum, ETF.COM (Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.etf.com/sections/blog/23268-alibaba-ipos-huge-etf-conundrum.html?nopaging 
=1 [https://perma.cc/R6XA-V35S] (“The exclusion of Alibaba from most MSCI- and FTSE-
based ETFs has some big implications from the perspective of Alibaba shares and ETF 
investors, since the lion’s share of assets in emerging market ETFs are tied to MSCI and 
FTSE-based indexes.”); Tomi Kilgore, Alibaba Can’t Join in the S&P 500, MARKETWATCH 
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/aliba ba-cant-join-in-the-sp-500-2014-
09-12 [https://perma.cc/A2HH-7SDU]. 
89 See, e.g., S&P DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 84, at 6. 
90 Indeed, it is plausible to assume, at least in the case of the exclusion of BDCs, that the 
large index fund managers favored these exclusions, as those index fund managers would 
avoid having to include the fees and expenses of the BDCs in their expense ratios, which 
might then compare unfavorably with actively managed funds. 
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incentives of index fund managers.91 Among other things, index fund managers 
have an incentive to be excessively deferential to the corporate managers of their 
portfolio companies.92 For instance, index fund managers have a variety of 
business ties to public corporations, including those that they hold in their 
portfolios, and they may be concerned about losing those valuable ties were they 
to take positions that the managers of those corporations disfavored.93 Because 
index fund managers hold substantial positions in many public companies, they 
are also particularly susceptible to regulatory intervention. Were they to 
frequently take positions that corporate managers disfavor, then those managers 
might ignite a regulatory or public backlash against index fund managers.94 
These incentives are likely to push index fund managers to generally adopt 
practices that are more deferential to managers. There is also evidence that these 
incentives influence the actions that index fund managers take with respect to 
regulatory and judicial matters.95 It follows that those incentives might also 
influence index fund managers to take a position on index exclusions that 
corporate insiders are likely to prefer. 
In sum, the discussion above suggests that neither of the reasons given by 
BlackRock for its opposition to the index exclusions—the rational objection 
based on competition with other funds and the principled reason based on the 
desire to increase the investable universe—are based on valid reasoning. 
II. A THEORY OF THE EFFECTS OF INDEX EXCLUSIONS 
This Part provides a comprehensive theory of index exclusion and its impact 
on insiders’ decision-making. Section II.A sets forth a structural analysis of 
insiders’ incentives, showing that index exclusions are likely to have a limited 
effect on their choices as to whether to adopt (or retain) disfavored 
arrangements. Section II.B sheds light on a number of reasons why, on the other 
hand, the index exclusions should not be expected to have zero effect, as some 
scholars have recently argued.96 
A. The Limited Effects of Index Exclusion 
The starting point for our analysis is that, unlike mandatory regulation that 
bans certain governance practices, the use of index exclusion would not 
necessarily eliminate the targeted practices. However, at least in theory, index 
exclusions should increase the cost of capital for excluded companies. This is 
because index funds who make up a significant percentage of demand for most 
 
91 See generally Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 8; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 26. 
92 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 26 (manuscript at 21). 
93 Id. (manuscript at 23-25). 
94 Id. (manuscript at 27-29). 
95 Id. (manuscript at 48-52). 
96 See Winden & Baker, supra note 76, at 49. 
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public companies, as well as the closet indexers that follow indexes to some 
extent, will not purchase the company’s stock. And if index funds and closet 
indexers will not buy the stock of those companies (or will have to sell the stock 
of newly excluded companies that they currently hold), then the price that 
investors will be willing to pay for the company stock will be depressed when 
the exclusion comes into effect.97 It has also been argued that inclusion in an 
index leads to greater liquidity, and therefore a decline in investors’ required rate 
of return, promoting higher prices.98 
However, as we describe below, it is unlikely that index exclusions will 
significantly deter disfavored arrangements, for a number of reasons: (1) the 
financial effect of the index exclusion on firm value is not likely to be very large 
in the first place; (2) in many cases the company might not be included in any 
case because index providers exercise some discretion with respect to certain 
indexes; (3) index inclusion might only occur at some time in the future, and 
therefore its beneficial effects need to be discounted to present value; and (4) 
where any index inclusion would only occur at some point in the future, insiders 
can go public with a disfavored arrangement at the IPO stage and retain the 
option to change that arrangement when the company would otherwise satisfy 
the preconditions for index inclusion. These factors must also be weighed 
against the private benefits that insiders derive from adopting the disfavored 
arrangements, which will often be significant and sufficient to outweigh the cost 
to the insiders of the index exclusions. Moreover, when the decision whether to 
retain a disfavored arrangement is made midstream in a company’s existence, 
the costs from the index exclusion are divided among all shareholders, whereas 
the insiders fully capture private benefits of control from the disfavored 
governance arrangements. Below we consider each of these factors in turn. 
(1) The financial effects of index inclusion on stock prices. There is 
considerable financial research regarding the effects of index inclusion on stock 
prices.99 As noted above, the basic presumption in this literature has been that 
adding a stock to an index will create increased expected demand from the index 
funds and closet indexers tracking the index, which will in turn increase the price 
of the stock. Indeed, early studies by financial economists estimate that inclusion 
in the S&P 500 index increases firm value between 3% and 8.8%.100 
 
97 Matt Levine, The End of Libor and Non-Voting Stock, BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2017, 9:36 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-27/the-end-of-libor-and-non-votin 
g-stock; see also Anand & Robertson, supra note 59; Tan & Robertson, supra note 19 
(quoting Jay Ritter). 
98 See, e.g., Shantaram P. Hegde & John B. McDermott, The Liquidity Effects of Revisions 
to the S&P 500 Index: An Empirical Analysis, 6 J. FIN. MARKETS 413, 459 (2003) (noting 
improved liquidity expectations). 
99 For a survey of this literature, see Pyemo N. Afego, Effects of Changes in Stock Index 
Compositions: A Literature Survey, 52 INT’L FIN. ANALYSIS 228, 239 (2017). 
100 Messod D. Beneish & Robert E. Whaley, An Anatomy of the “S&P Game”: The Effect 
of Changing the Rules, 51 J. FIN. 1909, 1924-25 (1996); Honghui Chen, Gregory Noronha & 
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More recent studies find a much more limited effect, concluding that the S&P 
500 index exclusion effect has essentially disappeared in recent years and may 
never have been a real source of long-term lower capital costs.101 We note, 
however, that these studies are limited to inclusion in the S&P 500 index. It well 
may be inclusion in the S&P 500 index brings limited benefit, because the newly 
included company was previously included in other indexes, such as the S&P 
400 or the Russell 1000. In other words, these studies cannot be taken as 
evidence that exclusion from all of these indexes would have no effect. 
Early studies on the S&P 500 index inclusion effect were extended to other 
indexes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These studies show positive price effects, 
similarly to the findings that were found in earlier studies on the S&P 500 
inclusion effect.102 Most relevant for our purposes are studies that focus on the 
index inclusion and exclusion effect for the Russell 2000 index. One study 
considers index premiums from 1990 to 2005 and finds price effects for 
inclusions of 8.8% for the S&P 500 and 4.7% for the Russell 2000, and price 
effects for deletions of 15.1% for the S&P 500 and 4.6% for the Russell 2000.103 
A second study found that investors in S&P 500 funds lost between 0.03% and 
0.12% annually from index changes, while investors in Russell 2000 funds lost 
between 1.3% and 1.84% each year from index changes.104 
 
Vijay Singal, The Price Response to S&P 500 Index Additions and Deletions: Evidence of 
Asymmetry and a New Explanation, 59 J. FIN. 1901, 1908 (2004) (showing that between 1976 
and 1989 gains equaled 3.17%, and between 1990 and 2000, 5.45%); Anthony W. Lynch & 
Richard R. Mendenhall, New Evidence on Stock Price Effects Associated with Changes in the 
S&P 500 Index, 70 J. BUS. 351, 351-52 (1997) (showing that between 1990 and 1995 gains 
equaled 3.80%); Antti Petajisto, The Index Premium and Its Hidden Cost for Index Funds, 18 
J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 271, 272 (2011) (showing that between 1990 and 2005 gains equaled 8.8%, 
and from 2001 to 2005, 4.5%); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 
41 J. FIN. 579, 584 (1986) (showing that between 1976 and 1983 stocks added to the S&P 500 
experienced abnormal returns of about 3% one day after the announcement); William B. 
Elliott et al., What Drives the S&P 500 Inclusion Effect? An Analytical Survey, FIN. MGMT., 
Winter 2006, at 31, 32 (showing that between 1993 and 2001 gains equaled 5.67%). 
101 See Konstantina Kappou, The Diminished Effect of Index Rebalances, 19 J. ASSET 
MGMT. 235, 243 (2018) (finding that newly added firms inflate S&P 500 index by less than 
ten basis points per year); Nimesh Patel & Ivo Welch, Extended Stock Returns in Response 
to S&P 500 Changes, 7 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 172, 208 (2017) (claiming that since 
2000s, stocks no longer experience permanent shifts in investor demand when they are added 
or removed from the S&P 500); Jan Schitzler, S&P 500 Inclusions and Stock Supply, 48 J. 
EMPIRICAL FIN. 341, 356 (2016) (showing that index inclusion effect based on stock demand 
and supply has disappeared); Chan Wung Kim, Xiao Li & Timothy T. Perry, Adaptation of 
the S&P 500 Index Effect, J. INDEX INVESTING, Summer 2017, at 29, 36 (finding no evidence 
of positive price drift between announcement date and effective date for newly added stocks 
from 2010 to 2013). For a review of this literature, see Winden & Baker, supra note 76, at 50. 
102 For a list of these studies, see Winden & Baker, supra note 76, at 19 nn.52-53. 
103 Petajisto, supra note 100, at 272. 
104 Honghui Chen, Gregory Noronha & Vijay Singal, Index Changes and Losses to Index 
Fund Investors, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July/Aug. 2006, at 31, 47. 
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While this empirical evidence regarding the financial benefits of index 
exclusion is mixed, it appears to show that index inclusion has relatively limited 
benefit. If one follows the later studies on the S&P 500 effect to conclude that 
index inclusion has no price impact, then index exclusions should have no 
impact on insiders’ decisions whether to adopt disfavored corporate governance 
arrangements. While we believe there are reasons to be cautious about applying 
these studies to conclude that exclusion from all indexes would have no effect, 
at best these studies would suggest that the financial benefits from index 
inclusion are limited. 
(2) Delayed impact of the index exclusion penalty. Most indexes have 
minimum market capitalization levels for inclusion, and many IPO companies 
will be too small to be immediately eligible for inclusion. Instead, they will need 
to wait some time until their market capitalization has grown sufficiently to be 
eligible for inclusion. As a result, the costs to those companies from an index 
exclusion must be discounted by the time value of money for the period until 
they would otherwise be eligible for inclusion. The longer the delay, the lower 
the costs to insiders from an index exclusion. In contrast, the benefits to insiders 
from the disfavored governance arrangement will accrue immediately, from the 
time of the IPO. The delay until an IPO company becomes eligible for index 
inclusion also increases the likelihood that, by the time it is eligible, index 
providers may have amended their policies to remove or weaken the index 
exclusion, thereby allowing the company to be included despite having the 
disfavored arrangement.  
(3) Conditionality. As noted earlier, inclusion in S&P composite indexes, 
including the S&P 500, is discretionary.105 Since S&P exercises discretion 
regarding which companies are included in those indexes, a company may not 
be included whether or not it has the disfavored governance arrangement. The 
reduced likelihood of being included in these indexes further reduces the relative 
cost of index exclusions. 
(4) Optionality. The delayed impact of the index exclusion rules also allows 
insiders that go public with a disfavored governance arrangement to have the 
option to remove that arrangement immediately before they would otherwise 
become eligible for index inclusion. As a result, even if insiders do wish to be 
included in the index at some point in the future, they have no reason to avoid 
the disfavored governance arrangement when they go public. They have a “free 
option.”106 The availability of that option further reduces the cost to insiders of 
index exclusions. 
Putting these factors together, the expected reduction in firm value due to 
index exclusions can be thought of as the cost of being excluded from the index, 
 
105 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
106 Anita Balakrishnan, Start-Ups Go Public to Get Your Money — Your Input on How It’s 
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multiplied by the probability of the company not being discretionarily excluded 
in any case, discounted by the time it would otherwise take for the company to 
enter the index.  
Insiders will weigh their costs against the benefit they receive from the 
disfavored governance arrangement. In contrast to the index exclusion effects, 
these private benefits will accrue from the time of the IPO, so are not subject to 
a time-value discount. These benefits are also certain, rather than conditional. 
And the insider has the free option to trade those benefits for index inclusion by 
eliminating the disfavored arrangement when the company would otherwise 
become eligible for inclusion in the index. As a result, all else being equal, we 
predict that index exclusions will give insiders limited incentives to avoid 
disfavored arrangements that the insiders prefer. 
B. The Non-Zero Effect of Index Exclusions 
So far, we have explained why index exclusions are likely to have limited 
effect on insiders’ incentives to go public with disfavored arrangements. Does 
this mean that index exclusions have no effect and should be eliminated as some 
have argued? We do not believe so. In this Section, we describe several reasons 
why people should not expect index exclusions to have zero effect. 
1. Reduced Demand for Excluded Stock 
First, the index exclusion will reduce the demand for excluded stocks among 
a number of different groups. Most obviously, index funds benchmarked to those 
indexes will no longer purchase shares in the excluded companies. However, the 
reduced demand will also affect a number of other groups of investors.107 
As discussed above, many actively managed funds are actually closet 
indexers.108 Once a company is excluded from an index there may be a domino 
effect that pushes closet indexers to also divest from that company. This will 
further decrease the demand for the shares of companies excluded from the 
index. While some active funds that have investment beliefs about excluded 
companies may still buy the excluded companies’ shares, those actively 
managed funds that do not have particular views on excluded companies are 
likely to follow the index, and would therefore also exclude those companies 
from their portfolios. 
A number of other active managers that oppose the particular governance 
arrangement may have nonetheless bought shares of dual-class companies in the 
past because they wished to reduce the “tracking error” of their portfolio when 
measured against baseline indexes. Those funds will no longer have an incentive 
to invest in dual-class companies, so they can exercise their preferences against 
investing. 
 
107 John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 
20 (Sept. 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra 
ct_id=3247337. 
108 See Cremers & Petajisto, supra note 82, at 3331. 
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As a result, there is likely to be reduced demand for those companies that are 
excluded from the index. That reduced demand, in turn, is likely to have some 
effect on the price of their stock. Whether this effect will be strong enough to 
deter founders from taking their companies public with a disfavored governance 
structure is a separate question that depends on the size of the reduced demands, 
the private benefits that the founder derives from the dual-class structure, as well 
as other factors mentioned in Section III.A. 
2. Stickiness 
It could be possible that excluding certain companies from an index might 
cause investment managers that prefer to invest in dual-class stock to instead 
link their index funds to an index that does include companies with the 
disfavored governance arrangement. Alternatively, investors in index funds that 
no longer include dual-class stock might switch to another index fund that does. 
However, both of these decisions are likely to display significant “stickiness,” 
which is likely to limit the extent to which the market adjusts to the exclusion of 
those companies, for several reasons. 
First, it will likely be difficult for investment managers to change the index to 
which a particular fund is benchmarked. The foundational documents of most 
index funds indicate that their strategy is to follow a particular index.109 In order 
to change those documents, the fund would require a vote of the investors in the 
fund, which may be impossible; even if it were possible, it would be costly and 
expensive. Therefore, in order to switch indexes, a fund manager would have to 
set up a new fund, benchmarked to a different index, and channel its investors 
into that fund. 
Second, investors may be resistant to switching to a new index fund, so may 
not follow the fund manager’s channeling, and even if they have their own 
preference for including dual-class companies in their portfolio, they may not 
act on that preference by switching to a fund linked to an index that does. Index 
providers have spent considerable amounts marketing their brands, which is 
reinforced by the marketing of index fund managers that encourage investors to 
invest in funds that are linked to those brands. A new index provider would have 
considerably less brand recognition. Even if an existing provider created a new 
index, that index would have less brand recognition than their existing indexes. 
There is also a network effect that operates with respect to existing indexes. 
The large number of investment funds that benchmark to that index—whether 
index funds or actively managed funds that compare their performance to the 
index—makes that index more attractive as a benchmark for a new entrant, 
because they can compare their performance to the same benchmark as those 
other funds, which will be useful for investors attempting to compare 
investments. Conversely, it will be much less useful for a new fund to 
benchmark to an index that has very few other investors benchmarked to it, 
 
109 See, e.g., iShares Trust, iShares Core S&P 500 ETF 2018 Prospectus (Form 485) (Aug. 
1, 2018) (describing investment objective of fund). 
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because it will not be able to compare its performance easily to competing funds. 
As a result, it is unlikely that market forces would nullify the index exclusion. 
3. Symbolic significance 
At the very least, the index exclusion represents a symbolic win for investors 
in the battle on the future U.S. IPO market. Professors Marcel Kahan and Ed 
Rock have considered the possibility that many corporate governance debates 
contain a significant symbolic element.110 That investors were able to convince 
index providers to exclude disfavored arrangements suggests that investors have 
some power, even if this exclusion does not substantially reduce the number of 
companies going public with such governance arrangement. 
III. THE DUAL-CLASS INDEX EXCLUSION 
In this Part, we apply our general analysis to one of the most important 
applications of index exclusion rules to date: the case of the dual-class 
exclusions. 
A. Opposition to Dual-Class Structures 
Institutional investors have long expressed opposition to dual-class share 
structures.111 As Professor Lucian Bebchuk and one of us analyzed, dual-class 
share structures generate significant governance risks because they feature a 
unique combination of entrenchment and incentive misalignment.112 Controllers 
of dual-class companies own only a small fraction of the company’s equity 
capital and thus bear only a small (and sometimes extremely small) share of the 
costs that their actions may inflict on the company’s value. Despite this, they 
exercise effective control over decision-making and can capture the full private 
benefits of that control. This means that they may tolerate underperformance by 
the company where their private benefits from control offset the effect of the 
underperformance on their relatively small shareholdings. More importantly, 
these dual-class structures fully insulate minority controllers from market 
disciplinary forces. There is no threat that shareholders may remove them no 
matter how poor their performance as managers or how harmful the effects of 
their management on the interests of other public investors. This combination of 
entrenchment and weak ownership incentives could well lead to a wide range of 
distorted choices by the controller. 
For these reasons, a broad group of investors appear to disfavor dual-class 
voting structures. Most large investment managers and asset owners have 
 
110 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 1997, 1998 (2014). 
111 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
112 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, GEO. 
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policies in favor of equal voting rights.113 In addition, when shareholders at 
annual meetings vote on proposals requesting that companies adopt equal voting 
rights with dual-class voting structures, large investment managers and asset 
owners generally vote in favor of equal voting rights. Tables 1 and 2 below show 
the proportion of the votes on such shareholder proposals of each of the ten 
largest U.S. investment managers and five largest U.S. asset owners, 
respectively, that were in favor of, against, or split on proposals that went to a 
vote between 2013 and 2017. Tables 1 and 2 show that each of the largest 
investment managers and asset owners voted in favor of equal voting rights at 
least eighty-five percent of the time; and eight of the ten investment managers 
and all of the five asset owners voted in favor more than ninety percent of the 
time. 
 
Table 1. Investment Manager Voting in Shareholder Proposals 
Requesting One-Share One-Vote, 2013-2017. 
 
Investment Manager Meetings For Against Split 
BlackRock 51 88.2 9.8 2 
Vanguard 50 94 6 0 
State Street Global Advisors 49 100 0 0 
Fidelity Management & Research 40 85 10 5 
BNY Mellon 48 100 0 0 
JPMorgan Investment Management 43 90.7 4.7 4.7 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management 43 100 0 0 
T. Rowe Price Associates 41 100 0 0 
Wellington Management Company 40 97.5 2.5 0 




113 See supra note 29; see also Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 51, at 597-98. 
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Table 2. Asset Owner Voting in Shareholder Proposals 
Requesting One-Share One-Vote, 2013-2017. 
 
Asset Owner Meetings For Against Split 
New York State Teachers’ 
Retirement System 
37 100 0 0 
California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) 
43 95.3 4.7 0 
California State Teachers’ 
Retirement System (CalSTRS) 
47 100 0 0 
Florida State Board of 
Administration 
48 100 0 0 
New York City Pension Funds 29 100 0 0 
The New York State Common 
Retirement Fund 
36 100 0 0 
 
It is important to emphasize that investors’ strong preference against the use 
of dual-class shares without time limitation—as reflected both in their guidelines 
and voting patterns—is not contingent on the pricing of these arrangements. If 
investors’ major concern were that these arrangements were inappropriately 
priced, then those investors could refine their guidelines or voting decisions 
accordingly; they would support dual-class shares if they believed that they were 
priced appropriately. However, most outside investors do not show such support. 
Instead, they express strong and clear opposition to dual-class structures that do 
not contain sunset provisions, whereby the structures would expire after a certain 
period of time.114 This opposition is consistent across different companies, 
regardless of how the shares of those companies are priced.  
Moreover, the pricing mechanism does not assure that dual-class structures 
will not emerge against the preferences of outside investors; nor does it resolve 
the tension between outside investors’ revealed preferences and the structures 
put in place by insiders at the IPO stage. Even if the pricing mechanism were to 
work perfectly—a strong assumption by itself—then at best it would cause 
insiders to fully internalize the costs of using dual-class structures, but it would 
not prevent the emergence of these structures. 
 
114 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 51, at 597-98. A recent survey by Institutional 
Shareholder Services indicates that this view is shared among many institutional investors. 
The survey included 120 responses from institutional investors. Fifty-seven percent supported 
negative recommendations against directors at companies that go public with dual-class stock, 
and an additional twenty-four percent supported negative recommendations as long as there 
was no sunset provision on the unequal voting rights. Marc Goldstein, Institutional S’holder 
Servs., Inc., 2016-2017 Annual Benchmark Voting Policy Survey, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/05/2016-
2017-annual-benchmark-voting-policy-survey/ [https://perma.cc/2CDV-WLY2]. For CII’s 
statement supporting the use of a sunset provision, see supra note 36. 
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B. The Demand for Dual-Class Exclusions 
The use of dual-class structures is not a new phenomenon. Insiders taking 
their companies public have been using unequal voting for many years. This has 
spurred a similarly long-running debate regarding the overall efficiency of dual-
class structures. This Section considers the factors that have triggered the recent 
push for index exclusion to limit dual-class structures, and the institutional 
background and factors that led to index exclusion rules. In particular, we 
highlight two main factors: the rise in the number of dual-class IPOs and the 
increasing concern from the use of extreme separation mechanisms and 
investors’ willingness to avoid ratcheting. While the Snap IPO was the straw 
that broke the camel’s back, it came against the backdrop of these two important 
factors that generated significant opposition among institutional investors. 
1. The Increasing Frequency of Dual-Class IPOs 
In recent years there has been a rise in the number of dual-class IPOs. In 
particular, since Google went public with a dual-class voting structure in 2004, 
the incidence of dual-class structures among IPO companies has increased 
considerably. According to recent data, 19% of U.S. companies that went public 
on U.S. exchanges in 2017 had at least two classes of stock with differential 
voting rights, up from only 1% in 2005.115 
The use of dual-class IPOs is even more prevalent among large IPOs. The law 
firm Shearman & Sterling LLP wrote a comprehensive annual report which 
considered IPOs of companies with a market capitalization of at least $100 
million. The study found that 29% of the 62 such IPOs in 2015 had a multi-class 
structure, 19% of the 32 IPOs in 2016 had a multi-class structure, and 39% of 
the 59 IPOs in 2017 had a multi-class structure.116 
2. The Increasing Inequality of Dual-Class IPOs 
In recent years there has also been a rise in the number of companies that have 
gone public with extreme separation mechanisms. These mechanisms provide 
insiders with an absolute lock on control while still allowing insiders to unload 
a significant fraction of their equity stake. A prominent example is, of course, 
Snap’s issue of non-voting shares in its IPO. Altice USA, Inc. and Blue Apron 
Inc. are two other high-profile companies that went public with charters that 
 
115 Press Release, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Investors Petition NYSE, NASDAQ to 
Curb Listings of IPO Dual-Class Share Companies 3 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/ 
files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/FINAL%20Dual%20Class%20Petition%20Press
%20Release%20Oct%2024,%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PFN-E9H6]. 
116 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
SURVEY 2018, at 53 (2018), http://digitsal.shearman.com/i/1019978-2018-corporate-govern 
ance-survey/0? [https://perma.cc/JUQ5-CUQ6] (stating multi-class equity share statistics). 
The study excluded IPOs of foreign private issuers, special purpose acquisition companies, 
master limited partnerships, and REITs. 
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authorize zero-vote shares, although the shares that both companies issued in 
their IPOs did have voting rights.117 Other well-known dual-class companies, 
such as Google, Facebook, IAC/InterActiveCorp, NRG Yield, Inc., and Under 
Armour, Inc. have initiated midstream reclassifications that enabled the issuance 
of a third class of non-voting shares118 (although Facebook and 
IAC/InterActiveCorp later abandoned these plans in the face of shareholder 
lawsuits).119 
These extreme dual-class IPOs and reclassifications were met with strong 
opposition from investors. Why do investors care about such non-voting shares? 
In the typical dual-class company where investors do have voting rights, the 
majority—or a large minority—of the voting power of the company is held by 
the controller. Even though they have the right to vote, outside investors are 
therefore generally unable to influence voting outcomes at the company. 
There are a number of reasons why non-voting shares have encountered such 
opposition from investors. First, the distortion of the controller’s incentives 
becomes more severe as the gap between the controller’s cash-flow rights and 
voting rights widens. Also, where there are extreme separation mechanisms, the 
controller is unlikely to lose control in the future even if the controller disposes 
of almost all of its cash-flow rights in the company.120 Second, where outside 
shareholders lack the right to vote, the company is not required to file a proxy 
statement or, therefore, to disclose to investors certain important information 
that the proxy statement would otherwise contain.121 
Finally, and most importantly, this process can be seen as a ratcheting 
interaction among insiders and investors. Insiders in a particular IPO company 
have the opportunity to put in place a dual-class structure with greater inequality 
than has been used in the past. Advisors to IPO companies observe the response 
of investors to these proposed structures. If investors continue to buy shares in 
the IPOs of such companies without significant protest, then the level of 
inequality becomes the new limit on the arrangements that investors are prepared 
to accept. The process repeats, ratcheting the inequality of voting structures to 
ever higher levels, until investors finally protest the increasing inequality. 
Google’s IPO in 2004 was a test case in an IPO market that had seen almost no 
dual-class IPOs in the preceding years. The success of Google’s IPO led to a 
 
117 Altice USA, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 10 (May 24, 2018); Blue Apron Inc., 
Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 10-11 (June 29, 2017). 
118 Snap Inc., supra note 1; Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 112 (manuscript at 32-33). 
119 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 112 (manuscript at 32). 
120 We note, however, that even with the more common 1:10 low-high vote ratio, the 
controller would be able to maintain control voluntarily. 
121 Dov Solomon, The Importance of Inferior Voting Rights in Dual-Class Firms, BYU L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 21), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3179375. However, these companies could, and some of them do, disclose 
financial information to investors. Snap, for example, continues to publish, annually, 
quarterly, and immediate reports following its IPO. Id. (manuscript at 23). 
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wave of other dual-class IPOs. Since that time, most dual-class companies have 
gone public with a high-to-low vote ratio of 10-to-1.122 However, Snap deviated 
from this practice. Snap’s IPO also took place against the backdrop of a number 
of dual-class reclassifications that included the issuance of an additional class of 
non-voting stock.123 There was a concern among investors that Snap would set 
a precedent, and that other companies going public would follow suit.124 The 
situation was a question of who would blink first. The response of investors, and 
their calls for index exclusions for dual-class stock, are also partly explained by 
their interest in avoiding further ratcheting. 
C. The Dual-Class Exclusions as Evidence of Index Providers’ Reluctance to 
Regulate 
This Section shows that index providers’ tendency to act as reluctant 
regulators is clearly reflected in the dual-class exclusion rules they adopted. 
Since the index exclusions were very much imposed on index providers by some 
of their clients, the exclusion rules that index providers chose reflect a desire to 
appease those investors without making groundbreaking changes. As we show 
below, each of the index exclusions therefore contains important loopholes and 
limitations. 
1. S&P Dow Jones 
S&P will no longer add companies to those indexes if the company has a 
multiple share class structure. This appears to be a strict, flat exclusion rule.125 
However, existing index constituents with dual-class structures are 
“grandfathered” in—they are not affected by the exclusion.126 Additionally, the 
exclusion applied only to the S&P Composite 1500 and its component indexes, 
including the S&P 500. The S&P Global BMI Indexes and S&P Total Market 
Index will continue to include companies with dual-class shares, including those 
with limited or no shareholder voting power.127 Moreover, the methodologies of 
other S&P and Dow Jones branded indexes, which allow the index provider 
 
122 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 112 (manuscript at 21). 
123 See supra note 118-119 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra notes 157-158. 
125 See supra note 11 (announcing decision regarding multi-class shares and voting rules). 
126 See supra note 11.  
127 S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Share and Voting Rules, 
PR NEWSWIRE (July 31, 2017) [hereinafter S&P Dow Jones Indices], https://www.prnews 
wire.com/news-releases/sp-dow-jones-indices-announces-decision-on-multi-class-shares-
and-voting-rules-300496954.html [https://perma.cc/8ZHV-UPLF] (publishing S&P Dow 
Jones Indexes’ decision); see also S&P DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 84 (releasing official 
decision on multi-class shares and voting rules). 
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significant discretion regarding which companies to include in its indexes, 
remain unchanged by the new rules.128 
Other details of S&P index eligibility rules mean that the S&P index exclusion 
is unlikely to have an immediate impact on newly public companies for some 
time. S&P indexes require that IPO companies be traded on an eligible exchange 
for at least twelve months before the index considers them for addition. 
Companies must also meet other requirements before being eligible for the S&P 
Composite 1500 and its component indexes, which further delay the time at 
which most IPO companies would otherwise become eligible for inclusion in 
S&P indexes. Most prominently, S&P requires certain minimum market 
capitalization levels for index inclusion: $6.1 billion for the S&P 500; $1.6 
billion for the S&P MidCap 400; and $450 million for the S&P SmallCap 600.129 
In 2017, 98.5% of IPO companies were smaller than the $6.1 billion S&P 500 
threshold.130 Other eligibility requirements that IPO companies must meet include 
having adequate liquidity and a reasonable price; at least 50% of its equity must 
be held by the public (its “free float”); and financial viability, demonstrated by 
positive GAAP earnings in its most recent quarter and in the aggregate over its 
four most recent quarters.131 Many IPO companies—especially technology 
companies—go public before achieving GAAP profitability, so may also need 
to wait for some time before becoming eligible for inclusion in the S&P 
Composite 1500 and its component indexes.132 As discussed in Section II.A, the 
extended time before index inclusion would occur will reduce the effect of the 
dual-class exclusion rules, and allow those companies a longer free option to use 
a dual-class structure before it effectively prevents them from joining an S&P 
Composite 1500 index. 
2. FTSE Russell 
The dual-class exclusion adopted by FTSE Russell was limited in a different 
fashion. Companies will be excluded from the Russell 3000 indexes—including 
the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000—where outside shareholders have extremely 
low voting rights or no voting rights at all. To be included in FTSE Russell’s 
 
128 S&P Dow Jones Indices, supra note 127. The S&P 1500 composite only includes a 
sample of companies in their market cap brackets of about thirty percent. 
129 S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Changes to U.S. Indices and Updates to U.S. 




130 Calculated based on IPO dates from Compustat and market capitalization data from 
FactSet. FACTSET, https://www.factset.com/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). 
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indexes, companies must have at least 5% of their voting rights held by 
unrestricted public shareholders.133 
FTSE Russell’s index exclusions therefore capture only the most extreme 
structures of recent IPOs, such as the use of non-voting shares by Snap. Its 
exclusion will not affect most other types of dual-class structures, where insiders 
will be able to significantly reduce their fraction of corporate equity and still 
exercise control over the overwhelming majority of the firm’s voting rights. The 
5% eligibility standard is significantly lower than the threshold favored by the 
majority of investors who participated in FTSE Russell’s consultation process 
and thought that higher minimum voting rights hurdle was sensible. Of the 
investors participating in the process, 23% believed that the hurdle should be set 
at 5%, while 55% thought that should be set at 25%.134 FTSE Russell further 
limited the strength of its index exclusions by allowing those existing dual-class 
constituents that would otherwise be excluded to remain in the index for the next 
five years despite not meeting the eligibility criteria.135 
3. MSCI 
MSCI’s reluctance was the starkest of the three index providers. MSCI 
published a consultation paper in January 2018 which took the position that 
“listed unequal voting shares should be eligible for inclusion in indexes because 
they meet the definition of equity.”136 In a June 2018 update following its first 
consultation paper, MSCI recognized that low-voting shares cause a dilemma 
for investors who choose to passively track an index, and indicated that MSCI 
intended to adjust the weights of these dual-class stocks in its indexes to reflect 
both the company’s free float and level of voting power in the hands of outside 
shareholders.137 However, in October 2018, MSCI rescinded its intention to 
reduce the weight of dual-class shares and announced instead that companies 
 
133 See, e.g., CamberView Partners, S&P and FTSE Russell on Exclusion of Companies 
with Multi-Class Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/05/sp-and-ftse-russell-on-exclusion-of-companies-
with-multi-class-shares [https://perma.cc/NXZ5-5WV4]. By way of comparison, constituents 
of FTSE U.K. Index Series are required to have a minimum free float of 25% for U.K. 
incorporated companies, or 50% for non-UK incorporated companies. Id. 
134 FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION RESULTS 3 (July 2017), 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Res
ults.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RHL-SK7A]. 
135 FTSE RUSSELL, FAQ: MINIMUM VOTING RIGHTS HURDLE 4 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/Minimum_Voting_Rights_Hurdle_FAQ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7XJH-N8ZY]. 
136 MSCI, SHOULD EQUITY INDEXES INCLUDE STOCKS OF COMPANIES WITH SHARE CLASSES 
HAVING UNEQUAL VOTING RIGHTS? 3 (Jan. 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296 
102/8328554/Discussion+Paper_Voting+rights.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/8RLY-25WU]. 
137 MSCI, CONSULTATION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNEQUAL VOTING STRUCTURES IN THE 
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with dual-class structures would continue to be eligible for inclusion in MSCI 
indexes, without any weighting adjustment related to their voting structure.138 
MSCI explained that its previous proposed policy has proved to be a polarizing 
issue among international institutional investors.139 
The largest MSCI indexes are worldwide indexes, in which U.S. companies 
have a proportionately smaller weight. That MSCI’s index exclusions rules were 
expected to have less impact on U.S. dual-class companies may explain why 
there was less pressure on MSCI from U.S. companies to implement dual-class 
exclusion rules. Conversely, that MSCI’s index exclusion rules would have 
greater influence on non-U.S. companies, which have greater prevalence of 
unequal voting right structures, may explain why there was greater opposition 
to MSCI’s index exclusion rules from its clients that had proportionally greater 
investments outside the United States. 
The relative weakness of the current formulation of the S&P and Russell dual-
class exclusions and MSCI’s unwillingness to implement a dual-class exclusion 
rule, demonstrate the reluctance of index providers to act as governance 
regulators. The weakness of these rules also has significant implications for the 
likely effects of the dual-class exclusions. 
D. The Likely Effects of Dual-Class Exclusions 
As discussed in Part II, the decision whether to use a disfavored governance 
arrangement like a dual-class structure that is the subject of an index exclusion 
rule will depend on the balance between the cost associated with the index 
exclusion and insiders’ private benefits from that governance arrangement. 
Therefore, even if the dual-class exclusion imposes additional costs on IPO 
companies, those costs may be less than the significant countervailing benefits 
to insiders from using a dual-class structure. Even assuming that insiders fully 
internalize the costs of the dual-class exclusion at the IPO stage (a strong 
presumption by itself),140 insiders who attribute significant value and private 
benefit to control of the company may be willing to bear the additional costs of 
the index exclusions. They may therefore go public with a dual-class structure, 
notwithstanding the index exclusions. 
Our analysis suggests the costs to insiders of being excluded from the S&P 
indexes are expected to be moderate, at best, whereas the private benefits to 
insiders from maintaining a dual-class structure are likely to be substantial. First, 
as described in Section II.A, empirical evidence suggests the financial effects of 
the exclusion on the firm stock price is limited, and some have suggested that 
 
138 Press Release, MSCI, MSCI Will Retain the MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes 
Unchanged and Launch a New Index Series Reflecting the Preferences of Investors on 
Unequal Voting Structures 1 (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/ 
238444/PR_Voting_Results.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/EK8Y-FB9H]. 
139 Id. 
140 For a discussion of the problems associated with the IPO pricing mechanism, see supra 
note 39 and accompanying text. 
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there is no stock price effect from index exclusion. Second, due to the eligibility 
criteria of S&P, the impact of the index exclusion would be delayed to some 
uncertain future point when the company grows to the relevant market 
capitalization and profitability levels where it would otherwise be eligible for 
inclusion in the index. Most technology companies may not be eligible for 
inclusion in the S&P 500 or other S&P Composite Indexes for many years. This 
delay discounts the effect of the index exclusion: the larger the delay, the lower 
the costs for the insider. Third, because S&P index inclusion is discretionary, 
not all dual-class companies would be chosen for inclusion in the S&P even if 
they were eligible, further reducing the impact of the index exclusion. Finally, 
the delayed impact of the index exclusions extends insiders’ “free option” to 
continue having a dual-class structure until the company would otherwise be 
eligible for index inclusion, when it could unify its share structure if it wished 
to be considered for index inclusion. 
Unlike the limited costs of the S&P exclusion, which must be discounted by 
the time value of money and the uncertainty of index inclusion, the benefits from 
using a dual-class structure at the IPO stage are substantial, immediate, and 
certain. We therefore expect that insiders will have relatively weak incentives to 
relinquish dual-class structures at the IPO stage in order to comply with the S&P 
dual-class exclusion. 
FTSE Russell’s dual-class exclusion is likely to have an even weaker 
deterrent effect. FTSE Russell’s exclusion rules can be circumvented relatively 
easily, by ensuring that public investors always hold slightly more than 5% of 
the company’s voting rights. By maintaining just over 5% public voting rights, 
a dual-class company would increase their likelihood of being included in at 
least one important set of indexes: those provided by FTSE Russell. The impact 
of the Russell dual-class exclusion may also be limited because the financial 
benefit from inclusion in the FTSE Russell indexes may not be as great as that 
from inclusion in the S&P indexes. On the other hand, any impact of exclusion 
from FTSE Russell indexes will be felt much earlier than that related to S&P 
indexes, since the FTSE Russell index has no time-based eligibility threshold, 
lower minimum capitalization thresholds, and no discretionary factor limiting 
the probability of index inclusion. The discounts associated with delayed 
inclusion will therefore be lower, and there will be no reduction in impact from 
the uncertainty of index inclusion. The length of an IPO company’s free option 
to have dual-class shares before FTSE Russell index eligibility will also be 
shorter. 
Our analysis so far has focused on the decision whether to adopt a dual-class 
structure at the IPO stage. What about companies that have already gone public 
with a dual-class structure? If these companies are not already part of the S&P 
indexes, then they may face the impact of S&P index exclusion sooner than IPO 
companies. However, we predict that the potential impact of index exclusions is 
also likely to be limited. With the exception of the reduced time discount in the 
impact of the dual-class exclusion, the factors limiting the impact of index 
exclusions will also apply to midstream companies. 
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Finally, and most importantly, as Lucian Bebchuk and one of us have 
demonstrated, controllers have strong structural incentives not to dismantle the 
dual-class structure midstream even if such a structure could have an adverse 
effect on firm value (such as from dual-class exclusions).141 Even assuming there 
is an adverse cost-of-capital effect on firm value from the dual-class structure, 
that effect will be shared by all investors. The controller’s exposure to it will be 
limited to the proportion of cash-flow rights that the controller holds. This will 
often be very small, especially for small minority controllers. While the 
controller will bear only a small percentage of the cost of the dual-class 
exclusion, the controller will capture the full private benefit of control from the 
dual-class structure. Moreover, evidence shows that controllers’ fractions of the 
equity capital of their companies tends to decrease over time.142 When this 
occurs, insiders will bear an even smaller fraction of the cost of dual-class 
exclusion, while their incentives to use a dual-class structure to maintain control 
will increase.143 This effect is demonstrated by recent empirical evidence 
showing the persistence of inefficient dual-class structures over time.144 
E. Some Preliminary Evidence on the Effects of the Dual-Class Exclusion 
While our analysis in Section III.D suggests that the dual-class exclusions are 
likely to have limited effects on insiders’ incentives to go public with a dual-
class structure, this does not mean that the dual-class exclusions are meaningless 
and should be eliminated, as some have argued. Our analysis in Part II suggests 
that the benefits of the dual-class exclusions may be non-zero. In this Section, 
we test these hypotheses by examining (1) the number of dual-class IPOs before 
and after the announcement of the S&P and Russell index exclusions in July 
2017, and (2) the governance terms of these IPOs. 
1. The Incidence of Dual-Class Structures in IPOs 
We constructed a dataset of dual-class IPOs from three different sources: the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices database, the FactSet 
SharkRepellent.net database, and Professor Jay Ritter’s list of dual-class 
IPOs.145 Consistent with previous studies in the field, we excluded from our 
dataset financial companies, LLPs, REITs, foreign issuers, and acquisition 
 
141 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 51, at 613-17. 
142 Id. at 607-09. 
143 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 112 (manuscript at 8-10). 
144 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 51, at 616-18; Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & 
Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firm Evaluation 32-35 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 550, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062895 
(commenting on empirical data which shows that many dual-class firms fail to self-correct). 
145 The data is available at Jay Ritter, IPO Data, WARRINGTON C. BUS., 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [https://perma.cc/ZH48-MHYW] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2019). 
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companies. We hand-collected data on the proportion of IPO companies with 
dual-class provisions for the four-year period prior to the adoption of the index 
exclusion rules, and for the year following the adoption of the index exclusion 
rules. Figure 1 below shows the proportion of IPO firms in each of these years 
with dual-class structures. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of IPO firms with 
dual-class structures was gradually increasing, from 8.4% in July 2014 to 14.5% 
in July 2017. In the year after July 2017, they fell to 11.7%.146 
 




Two observations can be drawn from the Figure 1. First, index exclusion rules 
were not effective enough to substantially eliminate the use of dual-class shares. 
A year after the adoption of the index exclusion rules almost 12% of IPO 
companies adopted a dual-class structure.147 Insiders clearly continue to put in 
 
146 A recent study by CII provides additional support for our data. This study, which has 
similar parameters to our own, shows that the percentage of dual-class IPOs decreased from 
19% in 2017 to 11% in 2018. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, DUAL-CLASS IPO 
SNAPSHOT: 2017-2018 STATISTICS (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.cii.org/files/2018Y%20 
IPO%20Stats%20for%20Website.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UZ4-J86B]. 
147 Another recent report, which does not use the same exclusions we use, found that dual-
class IPOs as a percentage of total IPOs have actually been increasing year-over-year, from 
17% in 2015, to 19% in 2016, 25% in 2017, and 27% in the first half of 2018. See Daniel 
Klausner, Dual Class IPOs Are on the Rise: Tech Unicorns Jump on Board this New Trend, 
PWC (July 18, 2018), http://usblogs.pwc.com/deals/dual-class-ipos-are-on-the-rise-tech-
unicorns-jump-on-board-this-new-trend/ [https://perma.cc/3HCE-ZYHU]. According to this 
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place dual-class structures in a substantial proportion of IPO companies, even 
after the adoption of the index exclusions. This desire for maintaining control 
through the use of dual-class structure is especially prevalent among unicorns, 
companies valued at $1 billion or higher.148 Second, we do observe a 20% 
decrease in the proportion of dual-class IPOs following the adoption of the index 
exclusions. Although the relatively small proportion of dual-class firms each 
year makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions, it would appear that the index 
exclusions may have had some impact in deterring insiders from using dual-class 
shares at some IPO companies. While it may be too early to attribute significant 
weight to this finding of the non-zero effect of the index exclusions, if it is borne 
out over subsequent periods it would be consistent with the evidence that we 
discuss in Section III.D.2 regarding the detail of dual-class provisions in IPO 
companies. 
2. Dual-Class Provisions of IPOs 
A review of the provisions of the dual-class IPOs that have occurred since 
Snap’s decision to go public with non-voting shares reveals two interesting 
trends. 
Increase in time-based sunsets. First, there has been a limited, but increasing, 
number of multi-class companies that are choosing to go public with time-based 
sunset provisions in their charters. The triggering of such a sunset provision 
automatically eliminates the multi-class capital structure.149 Groupon, Inc., for 
example, adopted a five-year sunset clause prior to its IPO in 2011, and, as a 
result, it converted to a single-class company in 2016.150 Dual-class companies 
going public with such a provision would be eligible to enter the S&P Composite 
Indexes after the sunset expires, which may only be several years after their IPO. 
CII has tracked 25 U.S. companies that went public with simple time-based 
sunsets since 2004, including 19 in 2013-2018. CII’s data shows that the rate of 
adoption of sunset provisions in IPOs has increased. In 2017-2018 there were 
eleven such sunsets (representing 26% of the dual-class IPOs in 2017, and 33% 
in 2018), compared to only six sunsets in 2015-2016, and only two in 2013-
2014. The period of such sunsets ranges from three years to twenty years. Most 
 
numbers) than the entire year of 2016. Id.; see also Levine, supra note 97 (discussing impact 
of index exclusion rules on companies with non-voting stock). 
148 New Intelligize Report Finds Significant 2018 Increase in IPOs for Companies Valued 
at $1 Billion+, IPO EDGE (Feb. 26, 2019), http://ipo-edge.com/2019/02/26/new-intelligize-
report-finds-significant-2018-increase-in-ipos-for-companies-valued-at-1-billion/ (finding 
that “30 percent of unicorns went public [in 2018] with a multi-class stock structure”). 
149 For an economic analysis indicating that the benefits of multi-class structures can be 
expected to decline, and the costs to rise, over time, see Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 113, 
at 630. 
150 Groupon, Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 6, 98 (Nov. 
1, 2011). See generally Groupon, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 31, 2016).  
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sunsets are in the range of seven to ten years. The mean length of sunset periods 
so far in 2018 is 7 years, down from 9.5 years in 2017, and 10.3 years in 2016.151  
No more non-voting shares issued in IPOs. The investors’ response to the 
Snap IPO seems to have been successful in preventing other companies from 
following suit by issuing non-voting shares in their IPOs. In our dataset, we 
observed four multi-class companies that went public with an authorized class 
of non-voting shares following Snap’s IPO: Altice USA, Angi Homeservices, 
Blue Apron, and Dropbox. None of these companies issued such non-voting 
shares at the IPO, but rather kept them “on the shelf” for future use. Thus, at 
least in theory, those companies would still be eligible for inclusion in the 
Russell 3000 indexes.152 Of course, as Lucian Bebchuk and one of us have 
explained elsewhere, once a company goes public with an authorization for non-
voting shares, its controller can use its majority voting power to unilaterally 
expand the number of authorized non-voting shares and issue them at a later 
stage as a dividend.153 
Finally, we note that Lyft’s recent high-profile decision to go public with a 
dual-class structure does not include non-voting shares.154 Since Lyft’s co-
founders are expected to hold at the IPO stage slightly less than 50% of the 
voting rights, it would have been considerably more attractive for them to adopt 
a capital structure that includes non-voting shares.155 The issuance of non-voting 
shares would have enabled Lyft co-founders to further unload their equity stake 
without diminishing their voting power, which is barely below 50%. Lyft’s co-
founders’ decision not to issue non-voting shares would appear to be an 
illustration of the impact of investors’ reactions to Snap, and of the adoption of 
index exclusions on founders’ decision-making.156  
3. The Dual-Class Exclusion as a Symbolic Victory 
In the high-profile corporate governance controversy over non-voting shares 
and dual-class structures, the Snap IPO quickly became a test case regarding 
who would blink first between investors and IPO companies. The vocal 
opposition to the Snap IPO structure from institutional investors and asset 
managers sent a signal to potential IPO companies and their advisors, which led 
to the consideration and adoption of index exclusion rules by the index 
 
151 See supra notes 36 and 146. 
152 We also noticed that the number of authorized non-voting shares was somewhat limited 
compared to the total number of authorized shares: In Altice it is about 1% of the total 
authorized shares, in Blue Apron and Dropbox about 20% of the total authorized shares, and 
Angi Homeservices about 27%. 
153 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 112 (manuscript at 31). 
154 Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendent No. 1 to Form S-1), at 13 (Mar. 1, 2019). 
155 Id. at 199-202. 
156 We note, however, that Lyft nonetheless exhibits extreme separation, providing its co-
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providers. This was an outcome with symbolic importance. This is reflected in 
the rhetoric of some leading figures in the debate. For example, Aeisha 
Mastagni, a portfolio manager with CalSTRS, the second-largest asset owner in 
the United States, stated that “[t]here is a line in the sand, and Snap crossed it. 
We don’t want Snap to set a precedent.”157 Anne Sheehan, CalSTRS’ director 
of corporate governance, stated that that “while CalSTRS and other large 
investors have been critical of dual-class shares elsewhere, the Snap IPO was 
the ‘spark that raised the discussion to a new level. . . . [W]e are sending a 
message that this is not acceptable behavior.’”158 Similarly, after the Snap IPO, 
CII Executive Director Ken Bertsch told the SEC Commission Investor 
Advisory Committee that, with Snap’s listing, “perhaps the bottom has been 
reached” in a 30-year listing-standards race to the bottom.159 These sentiments 
suggest to investors that their ability to push index providers to exclude dual-
class companies sent a signal to the market that investors were not powerless, 
which could be considered a symbolic victory for those investors. 
Of course, it is necessary to take into account the divergence among investors 
described in Section I.D. The index fund managers that have opposed the index 
exclusions may not regard the exclusions as a victory. Indeed, their opposition 
puts pressure on index providers and regulators to reverse the index exclusions, 
and therefore, to weaken even the symbolic victory. 
IV. LESSONS AND WAYS FORWARD 
The fundamental issue that underpins this Article—how investors can 
influence insiders’ decisions regarding governance arrangements that the 
investors disfavor—is a collective action problem. If the vast majority of major 
outside investors shared the same views about these arrangements and could 
effectively act in a unitary fashion, they would not participate in the IPOs of 
dual-class firms, and IPO firms would be forced to go public with a single-class 
structure, or miss out on access to the public capital markets altogether. In the 
real world, however, achieving such a high level of agreement and coordination 
among a large number of investors is unrealistic. The reasonable solutions to the 
collective action problem involve legislation or regulation, either in state 
corporate law, federal securities laws or regulations, or at the exchange level. 
However, the prospect of such regulation to further limit the freedom of 
insiders to adopt disfavored governance arrangements is unlikely. As we 
discussed in Part I, the competition for incorporations and listings usually leads 
state lawmakers and exchanges to follow the preferences of insiders rather than 
investors. SEC regulation could also limit exchanges from listing dual-class 
companies, which would have the advantage of overcoming the competition 
problem faced by U.S. exchanges. However, the SEC is likely to be reticent to 
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implement such a rule. Part of this comes from the risk of the rule being vacated 
by the D.C. Circuit following Business Roundtable.160 In addition, as discussed 
in Part I, the SEC has structural incentives to maintain the competitiveness of 
the United States as a prime location for listings compared to other jurisdictions, 
which further limit the willingness of the SEC to constrain dual-class structures.  
Therefore, while we support investors’ recent calls for the NYSE and Nasdaq 
to limit the use of dual-class shares without time limitation, we recognize the 
unlikelihood of U.S. exchanges constraining such disfavored arrangements at 
the behest of investors. Unless U.S. exchanges or the SEC change their policies, 
investors will have to evaluate other alternative channels of influence. To that 
end, Section IV.A lays out several important lessons regarding index exclusions, 
and Section IV.B considers alternative ways forward. 
A. Lessons from the Index Exclusion Experiment 
What should we make of the important corporate governance experiment, of 
having index providers act as “governance regulators”? The experiment has 
several lessons. 
First, our analysis shows that index providers face a complex set of conflicted 
interests and incentives which make them reluctant regulators. Index providers’ 
reluctance to regulate is clearly reflected in the dual-class exclusions that they 
have adopted, or rejected. Even where index providers have adopted dual-class 
exclusions, they have important loopholes and limitations. Investors should not 
expect index providers to be fearless protectors of investor interests. Instead, 
index providers are likely to come up with moderate rules that compromise 
between the different preferences of their clients and are less likely to trigger a 
regulatory reaction. 
Second, in our view, the most significant constraint on index providers’ action 
comes from the disagreement among investors regarding whether index 
exclusions should be used to achieve investors’ common goals. Some investors 
advocate for this approach, others oppose it. This disagreement stems from the 
fact that all investors could benefit from limiting disfavored arrangements, but 
the potential costs from index exclusions are born by a subset of investors: those 
who blindly follow the index. If major outside investors—both indexed and 
actively managed—could reach common policy preferences regarding 
disfavored arrangements like dual-class structures, then index providers would 
implement such a policy without equivocation. We discuss this possibility in 
greater detail in Section IV.B. 
Third, index exclusions have important natural limitations. By the very nature 
of their business, index providers aim to mimic the existing broad markets and 
are therefore limited in the extent to which they can exclude companies from 
their indexes. Given this natural limitation, we recognize that not every 
arrangement that investors disfavor can or should be an appropriate candidate 
 
160 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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for an index exclusion. Index exclusions are a weapon of last resort; they should 
be exercised carefully, and only when investors have no real ability to influence 
insiders’ decision through private ordering. In this light it is clear that dual-class 
structures are a good fit for index exclusions. Dual-class arrangements are 
categorically different from corporate governance in single-class companies. 
Where there is no dual-class arrangement, other corporate governance 
arrangements that are disfavored by a majority of the company’s equity can be 
eliminated through the normal corporate election process. Because they are not 
susceptible to such private ordering, dual-class structures persist despite outside 
investor opposition.161 Once companies adopt a dual-class structure at the IPO 
stage, outside investors have no power to eliminate them through the corporate 
election process. This is because insiders who retain control over the company’s 
decision-making through the dual-class structure are the ones who determine the 
vote outcome, and can reject proposals to eliminate the dual-class structure or to 
replace directors even when they are supported by a majority of the company’s 
equity. 
Fourth, investors should also recognize that the structure of index inclusion 
rules limits the impact of index exclusions on IPO firms. Because such firms 
would only be eligible for inclusion at some future point in any case, the impact 
of index exclusions must be discounted for such delay. The delayed impact of 
the index exclusion rules also extends the free option that insiders have to use a 
disfavored arrangement while preserving the possibility of removing the 
arrangement when the company otherwise becomes eligible for index inclusion.  
Fifth, despite the foregoing, we do not suggest that index exclusions are 
meaningless, as some scholars have recently argued.162 In fact, our preliminary 
data shows that, at least at this stage, index exclusions appear to have had some 
limited impact on insiders’ choice of IPO arrangements, or at least coincided 
with directional changes in those choices. The percentage of dual-class IPOs has 
decreased, there has been a limited but important increase in the use of time-
based sunsets, and there have been no further IPOs where companies have issued 
non-voting shares. Investor opposition that triggered the index exclusions could 
also be considered a symbolic victory for investors. 
Finally, we believe that the recent calls to eliminate index exclusions are 
premature. The limited evidence regarding the effects of the index exclusions 
makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding their effectiveness. 
We suggest that investors, index providers, and policy-makers would be better 
served by pausing to observe the impact of the index exclusions. In the 
meantime, outside investors should consider whether there are alternative viable 
and effective mechanisms to discourage insiders from adopting disfavored 
arrangements at the IPO stage. Of course, if investors conclude that there are no 
such viable alternatives, then index exclusions may be better than nothing. We 
turn to discuss the possibility of alternative mechanisms in Section IV.C. 
 
161 See supra note 147. 
162 See Winden & Baker, supra note 76, at 49. 
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B. Alternative Solutions 
In this Section we consider three alternative solutions to discourage insiders 
from adopting disfavored governance arrangements at the IPO stage: 
coordinated cooperative action of exchanges, providing index investors with a 
menu of investment index options with indexes that include and exclude the 
disfavored arrangement, and collective action by investors themselves.  
1. The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
In opposing MSCI’s dual-class exclusion proposal, BlackRock argued that “a 
global body such as [the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”)] is well positioned to establish global guidelines for listing standards 
that could then be translated into national regulation.”163 Constraining dual-class 
stock at the supranational level would also overcome the incentive problem of 
securities regulators in attempting to give their capital markets competitive 
advantages over other jurisdictions. However, the nature of IOSCO guidelines 
means that such a solution is unlikely to impose realistic constraints on 
disfavored governance arrangements like dual-class structures. 
IOSCO operates by consensus of its members, the securities regulators of its 
118 signatory countries, including the major international capital markets of 
Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Any attempt to 
constrain dual-class stock would require these markets to agree to constrain the 
disfavored arrangement. The SEC may be more willing to agree to constrain 
dual-class restrictions if other countries also agree to do so. However, the SEC 
might instead prefer to push the United States’ competitive advantage over other 
jurisdictions that currently do not permit dual-class listings. Even if these other 
major jurisdictions were to agree to constrain dual-class arrangements, there are 
many other jurisdictions in the world that currently permit dual-class companies 
and therefore might object to such an agreement. 
Even if IOSCO members decided to constrain dual-class structures, IOSCO 
operates by promulgating non-binding guidelines. It lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure its members follow its guidelines. As a result, individual 
members would be free to disregard those guidelines. Competitive pressures for 
the listing of dual-class companies mean that there would be significant 
incentives to do so. As a result, IOSCO as it is currently structured cannot 
function as an effective mechanism for constraining dual-class structures.164  
2. A Menu of Index Funds 
An alternative approach to disfavored corporate governance arrangements 
would be to ensure that investors have a full menu of index options, some of 
 
163 Letter from Barbara Novick to Baer Pettit, supra note 23. 
164 That BlackRock suggested IOSCO as their preferred mechanism for addressing the 
problem suggests that they are not currently committed to a realistic constraint on dual-class 
stocks. 
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which exclude companies with the disfavored arrangement and some of which 
do not. Such an arrangement would allow investors to determine how to allocate 
their capital with respect to the corporate governance arrangement. Those who 
are interested in investing in companies with disfavored governance 
arrangements could follow the inclusive indexes. Those that oppose those 
arrangements could follow the indexes that exclude companies with those 
arrangements. 
This approach would appear to satisfy index fund managers that wish to have 
access to indexes that contain the broadest possible set of companies. However, 
it misunderstands the goal of both diverging investor views regarding index 
exclusions. Those investors that favor index exclusions seek to discourage 
insiders from adopting disfavored governance arrangements such as dual-class 
structures. For index exclusions to influence the decisions of insiders, they must 
apply to the major indexes, especially the S&P 500, otherwise their effectiveness 
as a sanction is even further reduced. In order to ensure that insiders respect their 
preferences, outside investors need a coordination mechanism that reduces the 
amount of funds that automatically flow to companies with disfavored 
arrangements. To achieve that goal, a flat exclusion by all of the major indexes 
would be preferable to only some of the major indexes adopting such an 
arrangement, as the latter would still allow a significant amount of index 
investors’ funds to flow to public companies with disfavored governance terms. 
The index fund managers that oppose index fund exclusions are focused on 
the major indexes being as broad as possible. To those investors a new, broad 
index that has very few assets benchmarked to it would be a hollow solution if 
those companies are excluded from the major indexes that have the 
overwhelming majority of assets under management. This is because index 
funds wish to be able to compare their returns to other large index funds. If there 
is even a slight divergence in the benchmarks those funds follow (from 
differences in the inclusion or exclusion of those companies), then the ability to 
compare returns is reduced. The stickiness described in Section II.B.2 
compounds this problem, making it more difficult for index funds to move to a 
new index. The majority of fund assets will therefore stay benchmarked to the 
existing major indexes. The decision is therefore a zero-sum game, focused on 
whether the major indexes include or exclude companies with the disfavored 
arrangement. It is salient that no such alternative indexes have arisen to mirror 
the S&P Composite indexes, but without the dual-class exclusions. It would not 
be expensive for S&P to create such indexes. That they have not done so 
suggests that it would not be an effective solution.  
3. Collective Action by Investment Funds 
As we discussed above, constraints on disfavored corporate governance 
arrangements are a collective action problem. The solution to collective action 
problems is collective action. In a sense, index exclusions are a mechanism to 
achieve high levels of coordination among all index fund investors. However, 
they may not be a sufficient sanction to discourage private companies from 
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choosing disfavored arrangements, because they apply only to the pool of funds 
that are tied to indexes. As we have shown, that partial application creates 
divergence among investors, which decreases the likelihood that index 
exclusions will be used in the future.   
Consider, however, a scenario in which a broad group of investors—including 
both index funds and actively managed funds—were to develop common 
strategies regarding the desirable constraints on dual-class shares. This would 
overcome the threat of those funds “defecting” from a common strategy in order 
to outperform the other funds (and thereby potentially attract assets away from 
those other funds). None of those investors would invest in companies that did 
not meet the constraint. Such a mechanism is considerably more likely to be a 
sufficient sanction to discourage insiders from taking their companies public 
with disfavored governance arrangements. If the company were to adopt a 
disfavored governance arrangement it would miss out on access to a much larger 
pool of investors’ funds. Moreover, index providers would also have incentives 
to adjust their index exclusion rules accordingly. 
One issue with such a solution is that collective action by any group is 
costly.165 However, investors have already formed the Investors Stewardship 
Group (“ISG”), a group that includes index fund managers, active fund 
managers, and public pension funds. It is currently structured to recognize only 
existing consensus positions on corporate governance matters. But there is no 
reason why the ISG, or another group like it, could not become a forum for 
different investors to coordinate or act collectively on common positions on 
corporate governance arrangements, such as dual-class stock. Of course, this 
approach would mean that there would be limited sanctions for investors that 
failed to follow those principles in specific situations. Moreover, acting through 
an organization like the ISG would allow individual investors to reach their own 
decisions on general principles, rather than on firm-specific matters. This would 
obviate the need for investors to coordinate or act collectively with respect to 
particular companies. This has significant importance because acting 
collectively could cause the investors to be considered a “group” for the 
purposes of section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, which would require 
those investors to file disclosure on Schedule 13D rather than Schedule 13G.166  
The biggest problem with such collective decision-making would be that it 
might be successful. If so, it might demonstrate the power of investor decision-
making, and could trigger a backlash by regulators of the kind discussed in Part 
I. However, the investor group could reduce this threat by picking its battles 
 
165 See, e.g., Ann Lipton, supra note 58. 
166 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (reporting requirement for persons with more than five 
percent of any class of security); id. § 78m(g) (exceptions from those reporting requirements 
for certain investment companies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b) (2018) (clarifying obligations to 
file Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G). For a discussion of the effects of requiring large 
investment funds to file Schedule 13D disclosure, see Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 112 
(manuscript at 25-27). 
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judiciously. Adopting reasonable principles that do not threaten more than a 
limited set of public companies (such as companies with dual-class structures) 
would reduce the risk of a backlash. If investors following those general 
principles represented a substantial proportion of the stock of large public 
companies, it would also be more difficult for the managers of those companies 
to push back against those principles. 
CONCLUSION 
Certain governance arrangements, such as dual-class structures, have long 
been disfavored by a substantial majority of investors. However, public 
companies have continued to adopt those arrangements, because they have 
suited the insiders of those companies. For structural reasons, traditional sources 
of constraints on governance arrangements—state corporate law, listing 
exchanges, and federal securities regulation—have not been effective to 
constrain these disfavored arrangements. Index exclusions represent investors’ 
response, pushing index providers to change their rules with the goal of limiting 
the disfavored arrangements. This Article has provided a comprehensive and 
structural analysis of index providers as governance regulators, including the 
complex motives of index providers that limit their effectiveness as regulators, 
and the impact of the exclusions on insiders’ decision-making at the IPO stage. 
To date, the dual-class exclusion rules are the most important example of index 
exclusions in practice. The general structural analysis, and its application to the 
dual-class exclusions, allows us to draw a number of general lessons from the 
important corporate governance experiment that index exclusions represent. 
These lessons are all the more important, given the dominant role that index 
funds play in our capital markets, and consequently, the central place of index 
providers in corporate governance. 
